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• 
Jurisdiction 
Appellate jurisdiction is vested in the Court of Appeals under Utah Code 
Annotated ("UCA") §78A-4-103(2)(i), and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
1. 
Issues for Review 
Standards of Review 
Preservation 
Mechanic's Lien Attorney Fees. Defendant summarily defeated Plaintiff's two 
mechanic's liens before trial. The Mechanic's Lien statute, UCA §38-1-18, provides for 
attorney fees, as a matter of law, to the successful party defending against a lien under 
UCA §38-1-3. The trial court denied Defendant's attorney fees for successfully defeating 
the liens, and awarded Plaintiff its attorney fees for losing them. 
2. 
Issue for Review: In its interpretation of UCA §38-1-18, did the trial court 
err in awarding attorney fees to the losing party on the mechanic's liens? 
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation and legislative intent are 
questions of law, reviewed de novo for correctness. 
See Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, f/8, 123 P.3d 400; Gonzales v. 
Morris, 610 P.2d 1285, 1286 (Utah 1980) (citing Henrie v. Rocky 
Mountain Packaging Corp., 113 Utah 444, 202 P.2d 727 (1949)) 
Preservation: Appellant preserved this issue in the Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. (R. 143-152) 
Wrongful Lien. The Wrongful Lien statute, UCA §38-9-1, specifies that a lien is 
wrongful, and subject to legislated sanctions, if it is not authorized by statue, the court, 
or the property owner. Plaintiff's mechanic's lien on Defendant's property had no 
statutory authorization. Though the mechanic's lien did not cross the statutory 
'entitlement' threshold of UCA §38-1-3, the trial court ruled it was not wrongful because 
it was "statutory," but "unenforceable." 
Issue for Review: In its interpretation of UCA §38-1-3 and UCA §38-9-1, 
holding that Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was not wrongful, did the trial court 
err in denying statutory damages and attorney fees to Defendant? 
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation and legislative intent are 
questions of law, reviewed de nova for correctness. 
Pratt v. Pugh, 2010 UT App 219, 1[7, 238 P.3d 1073; Russell v. 
Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, 1[8, 999 P.2d 1244 
Preservation: Appellant preserved this issue in the Counter Petition to 
Nullify Wrongful Lien. (R. 17-31) 
3. Contract. Plaintiff and Defendant formed a contract for electrical services. At 
trial, Plaintiff advocated only for an express contract. Despite the court's finding that 
there was never an agreement on price, the court ruled there was an express contract 
and awarded Plaintiff the full amount of charges it arbitrarily computed. 
Issue for Review: Without an agreement for price, did the trial court err in 
its conclusion of law, that there was an express contract formed between 
Plaintiff and Defendant, rather than a contract implied-in-fact? 
Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed de novo for 
correctness. 
John Deere Co. v. A & H Equip., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct.App. 
1994) (citing Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582, 
583 (Utah App.1992)) 
Preservation: Appellant preserved this issue in the Written Closing 
Argument of Defendant. (R. 602-622} 
2 
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Statutes Of Interpretative Importance To Determine Appeal 
1. UCA §38-1-3: Mechanic's Liens (Addendum) 
2. UCA §38-1-18: Mechanic's Lien Attorney Fees (Addendum) 
3. UCA §38-9-1: Wrongful Liens (Addendum) 
4. UCA §38-9-4: Wrongful Lien Sanctions (Addendum) 
Statement of the Case 
This simple contract case over a disputed electrical services invoice totaling 
$1,827.61 is now entering its sixth year of litigation, generating attorney fees that are on 
course to exceed $100,000, and consuming significant judicial resources. The amount at 
t stake was never the $1,827.61 invoice total, but only a few hundred dollars. By the end 
of this litigation, attorney fees will approximate 10,000% of those few hundred. The 
• 
• 
disproportionate value of wasted judicial resources can never be calculated. 
In March 2011, Plaintiff, 1-D Electric (1-D), worked one day on a house in Herriman 
owned by Defendant, Linda Gillman (Gillman), and sent her an invoice. She immediately 
disputed the amount as excessive and offered to pay a reasonable sum.1 1-D refused to 
negotiate over the few hundred dollars of difference, instead electing the harshest 
device at its disposal-mechanic's liens . 
1-D filed two successive mechanic's liens. Both were unlawful. Both were 
eventually defeated summarily, but not before tens of thousands of dollars in attorney 
fees were expended. The mammoth attorney fees arising from I-D's failed mechanic's 
1 Exhibit 6, May 6, 2011 Gillman Letter to 1-D 
3 
liens would drive this case, not the underlying contract claim. (R. 752:32; 757:7-758:83; 
Compounding the litigation complications and expense 1-D instigated with the 
two mechanic's liens, the first lien was filed against a Salt Lake condominium Gillman 
owned that was unrelated to the electrical work on the Herriman house, introducing the 
collateral issue of whether this first lien, merely purporting to authority under the 
Mechanic's Lien statute, UCA §38-1-3, also qualified as "wrongful" under UCA §38-9-1, 
the Wrongful Lien statute. 
The mechanic's liens and the wrongful lien issue completely engulfed the 
litigation for more than three years. By the time the second lien on the Herriman house 
was dismissed on summary judgment in July 2013, 1-D had done nothing to prosecute 
the contract claim, but accumulated attorney fees were massive-all attributed to the 
lien issues. (R. 753:82; 758:103) No discovery was ever conducted in this case. (R. 753:72; 
758:93} 
The bloated attorney fees on lien litigation became the impossible barrier to a ~ 
negotiated resolution of the case, as 1-D jockeyed for some means of escaping that 
liability. 1-D would not negotiate a resolution without the quid pro quo that Gillman first 
abandon her statutory right to attorney fees for defeating the liens. (R. 752:32; 757:5-
758:83; 759:113) Meanwhile, the contract claim lay dormant and the court twice ordered 
2Af(idavit of Mark D. Stubbs, Attorney For Defendant 
3 Declaration of Paul D. Dodd, Attorney For Defendant 
4Order on Motion For Attorney Fees 
4 
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1-D to show cause why it should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (R. 243-2445; 
® 294-2956) The second order to show cause in February 2014, finally forced 1-D to 
confront the contract claim, which would not commence until July 2014, more than 
three years after the onset of litigation. 
1-D voluntarily dismissed the first lien. Judge Anthony Quinn's summary dismissal 
of the second lien in July 2013 was a crucial juncture in the case. Gillman had defeated 
~ both mechanic's liens and held the statutory right to attorney fees, which then 
exceeded $12,000. (R. 387:18-207; 753:1a8} Facing that statutory obligation, 1-D shifted 
• 
its litigation strategy in the summer of 2013, cultivating a theme that would endure 
throughout trial and beyond: 
Gillman was to blame for I-D's misplaced mechanic's liens because 
she knew, or should have known, that they were unlawful, and 
she failed to correct 1-D before those liens conclusively broke lien 
law. 
1-D further postulated that Gillman was accountable for I-D's exposure under the 
Wrongful Lien statute, creating the wrongful lien as a "cause of action" by her conduct: 
If Gillman had just educated 1-D in time to evade the illegality of 
the mechanic's liens, the wrongful lien on the Salt Lake condo 
could never have been an issue . 
This unfounded, 'Gillman-fault' theory depended on re-litigation of the 
mechanic's lien issue, which 1-D accomplished at trial, countermanding Judge Quinn's 
5 Order to Show Cause, May 2, 2013 
6 Order to Show Cause, February 7, 2014 
7 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
8 Affidavit of Mark D. Stubbs, Attorney For Defendant 
5 
summary judgment decision in July 2013 and taking advantage of the fragmented 
oversight by no fewer than six judges in the case.9 
The appropriate, remaining issues for trial were the contract claim and the 
wrongful lien question. The mechanic's liens and the lien foreclosure actions were 
summarily disposed long before trial. Nevertheless, the court included in its contract 
and wrongful lien rulings, the 'Gillman-fault' mantra, re-litigating the mechanic's liens to 
assess Gillman for attorney fees and costs expended throughout the litigation. 
In its Complaint, 1-D pied its express contract claim and alternatives of quantum 
meruit and unjust enrichment. (R. 80:23-81:2610) At trial, 1-D argued only for an express 
contract, and the court entered both findings and conclusions to that effect. The 
solitary writing between Gillman and 1-D was a sketchy work order that included no 
pricing. The court entered a finding that there was never an agreement for price, which 
was incompatible with its conclusion of law that there was a binding, express contract. 
Consistent with its conclusion that the contract was express, the court awarded 1-D its 
full charges of $1,827.61 as damages. 
The court ruled that the mechanic's lien on the Salt Lake condo was not wrongful, 
because it was "statutory," albeit "unenforceable." Applying the 'Gillman-fault' theory, 
the court drew a conclusion of law that it was Gil/man's conduct that made the 
9 This case was originally assigned to Judge Anthony Quinn. Judge Quinn's two accidents 
moved the case through the hands of six judges (Quinn, Faust, Lindberg, Pueller, Parker, 
McKelvie). Judge McKelvie inherited the case in July 2014, at pre-trial. 
10 Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint 
6 
• 
mechanic's lien unenforceable. Hence, the court denied her any damages because she 
created "the wrongful lien cause of action." 
The only contractual writing between 1-D and Gillman was the work order. It 
included a provision for "reasonable" attorney fees. The court made no attempt to 
calculate attorney fees on the "reasonable" basis of those factors, as grounded in law, 
and entered no findings on that core precedent. Invoking the 'Gillman-fault' maxim, the 
• court awarded 1-D its fees in equity, because: 
• 
• 
• The Herriman house mechanic's lien was not unlawful. 
• Gillman did not timely pay the express contract obligation, which 
virtually compelled 1-D to file the mechanic's liens-making her 
responsible for all the consequences. 
• Gillman conspired to use I-D's "harmless error" on its mechanic's 
liens to "create a wrongful lien cause of action." 
The court awarded 1-D $27,821.96 for attorney fees in June 2015, which included 
24% in pre-judgment interest that Plaintiff did not plead, but the court bestowed, sua 
sponte. Combined contract damages, attorney fees, and interest totaled to a judgment 
of $31,458.02. 
1-D filed for an amended judgment on July 15, 2015, seeking additional attorney 
fees of $5,481.27, increasing the total judgment to $36,939.29. The court entered I-D's 
proposed order for the amended judgment two days later on July 17, 2015, allowing 
Gillman no chance to respond. Gillman filed Notice of Appeal on August 10, 2015. 
7 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Statement of Facts 
Gillman resided in a Salt Lake City condominium she owned ("Salt Lake condo"). 
Gillman jointly owned a house in Herriman ("Herriman house"). (R. 652:19, 
Findings of Fact; 403-404:2-4, Affidavit of Defendant) 
March 10, 2011: Gillman engaged 1-D for electrical service on the Herriman 
house, meeting 1-D there in the afternoon to review the work. Gillman's primary 
purpose was to clear the trusses in the garage attic of electrical wires, so that a 
floor could be laid to accommodate storage. (R. 648:311, Findings of Fact, 404:7, 
Affidavit of Defendant) 
March 11, 2011 (Friday): 1-D worked one day on the Herriman house. Gillman 
was there most of the day and signed a work order before leaving. (R. Exhibit 2; 
404-405:10-11,13, Affidavit of Defendant; 648:4-6, 653:24-25, Findings of Fact) 
March 12, 2011 (Saturday): Gillman returned to the Herriman house and 
discovered 1-D had not moved most of the wiring that cluttered the garage attic 
trusses, preventing installation of the attic floor that was the primary purpose of 
the work: The main electrical line, 220 line, ground line, coaxial line, telephone 
lines, and other romex lines still randomly draped the area. (R. 650:12, Findings of 
Fact; 405:12, Affidavit of Defendant; 1324:13-18; 1355:6-17; 1356:24-1358:1; 1382:1-
1383:3} 
11The court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Order On Motion For Attorney 
Fees did not fully designate paragraphs by number or letter. For convenience of reference, 
those designations were added to the court's originals and appear as superscript. The altered 
originals are Tab #1 and Tab #2 in the Addendum. 
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5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
March 14, 2011 (Monday}: Kim Olson, president of 1-D, called Gillman to report 
that the cost of the work was $1,827.61. Gillman protested immediately. 
(R. 405:15., Affidavit of Defendant; 1112:20-23; 1186:10-17; 1190:19-23) 
March 24, 2011: 1-D sent Gillman an invoice for $1,827.61. Gillman made a hand 
notation on the remittance copy, asking for a labor allocation against each of the 
tasks on the work order and mailed it back. (R. Exhibit 4; 654:28, Findings of Fact; 
405:16-17, Affidavit of Defendant; 1366:13-22) 
April 7, 2011: Olson responded by letter to Gillman's request for the labor 
allocation. (R. Exhibit 5; 650:12, Findings of Fact; 405:17-18, Affidavit of Defendant) 
May 6, 2011: Gillman replied to Olson's labor breakdown, challenging the 
validity of the charges and offering to pay a reasonable amount for the work 
accomplished. 1-D never answered. (R. Exhibit 6; 405-406:19-22, Affidavit of 
Defendant; 1145:2-9; 1169:5-13; 1366:23-1368:9; 1371:25-1372:3) 
9. May 12, 2011: Olson turned the Gillman account over to I-D's counsel for 
(j) collection. {R. 607, Billing Records, Brady Gibbs) 
10. June 15, 2011 (approx.}: Gillman was out of town until about mid-June. On her 
return, notice of certified mail was waiting, but had already been returned to the 
sender on May 28th • The postman had written "Wrona Law Firm" on the notice. 
Not recognizing the name, Gillman found a number and called to inquire after the 
certified mail. She was connected to Brady Gibbs (Gibbs), who informed her that 
a lien had been filed against her property to collect the 1-D invoice. Gillman 
9 
expressed surprise that a lien would be filed over such a small amount of money, 
particularly since Olson had never replied to her May 6th letter, offering to settle. • 
Gillman specifically advised Gibbs that she was working out of state and could be 
gone for weeks at a time, asking him to send her regular mail, not time-sensitive 
certified mail, as she might not be in town to receive it. Gibbs did not comply, 
twice sending more certified mail that was returned while Gillman was away. 
Gillman offered Gibbs $650 to settle. (R. 406:23-407:27, Affidavit of Defendant: 
Exhibits 8, 9, 26; 1368:12-1372:13; 1375:24-1376:4; 1147:24-1148:22) 
11. Following this initial phone call with Gibbs, Gillman checked the County 
Recorder's records for a lien on the Herriman house, but found nothing. (R. 
654:30, Findings of Fact; 406:26-407:29, Affidavit of Defendant; 1375:13-1376:4) 
Unknown to Gillman at the time, 1-D had recorded a mechanic's lien against her 
Salt Lake City condominium, where no work or materials were ever provided, 
claiming authority under UCA §38-1-3. (R. Exhibit 10; 654:30, Findings of Fact; 
407:29, Affidavit of Defendant) 
12. June 21, 2011 (approx.): Gibbs called Gillman to convey a counteroffer of 
$1,650, which Gillman evaluated as unrealistic. She suggested Gibbs ask 1-D for a 
more equitable amount. Gibbs never contacted Gillman again to pursue 
settlement negotiation. (R. 407:27, Affidavit of Defendant: 1372:24-1373:9; 1145:2-9) 
Olson testified at trial that he directed Gibbs to convey a lower counteroffer of 
$1,350. (R. 1215:1-10} Gillman testified she never heard that number, except 
10 
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• 
during Olson's trial testimony. Gibbs' billing records indicate no other phone calls 
~ to Gillman. {R. 1373:25-1374:10; 670} 
13. During the call, Gillman asked Gibbs to confirm that a lien had been filed, as she 
could not find one in the county records, which he did. Gillman checked the 
county records twice in succeeding weeks, but found no lien on the Herriman 
house. (R. 407:28-29, Affidavit of Defendant; 1375:13-1376:4; 1145:10-16; 1147:2-10} 
@ 14. -+ Sept. 8, 2011: The 180-day, statutory deadline to file a mechanic's lien on the 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Herriman house expired, as a matter of law, under UCA §38-1-3. 
September 22, 2011: I-D filed suit to foreclose the mechanic's lien on the Salt 
Lake condo. {R. 1-11, Complaint, Summons) 
September 25, 2011 (approx.): Service of the foreclosure lawsuit12 was Gillman's 
first information that I-D had filed a lien on the Salt Lake condo. (R. 654:30, 
Findings of Fact; 407:29, Affidavit of Defendant; 1373:10-12; 1148:12-1149:17) The 
mechanic's lien notice was appended to the Complaint. {R. Exhibit 10; 1-8, 
Complaint) 
November 4, 2011: I-D filed a lis pendens on the Salt Lake condo, almost two 
months past the statutory deadline. (R. Exhibit 11) 
18. November 11, 2011: Gillman personally delivered a letter to I-D-notifying that 
the mechanic's lien and lis pendens on the Salt Lake condo had no legal basis, 
c, 12 Gillman was not personally served with the Complaint. The process server pushed the 
paperwork under the garage door of Gillman's condo, which she noticed a couple of days 
following the date notation in the service block of the Summons. {R. 9) 
11 
requesting that they be immediately removed. (R. Exhibit 12: 408:32-33, Affidavit of 
Defendant) 
19. December S, 2011: Gillman petitioned the Court to nullify the wrongful lien on 
the Salt Lake condo. (R. 17-31., Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien) 
20. December 6, 2011: 1-D 11amended" the Salt Lake condo lien by substituting the 
legal description of the Herriman house-three months past the statutory 
deadline, which had expired Sept. 8, 2011. (R. Exhibit 16) Gillman's counsel 
warned Gibbs that any amendment was well beyond the statutory deadline and 
illegal. (R. 757-758:3-7, Declaration of Paul D. Dodd, Attorney For Defendant) The 
11amendment" effected a voluntary release of the mechanic's lien on the Salt Lake 
condo, but liened the Herriman house. 1-D released the lis pendens. (Exhibit 15) 
21. December 19, 2011: 1-D filed its First Amended Complaint, pleading the same 
causes of action as its original, substituting the Herriman house for the Salt Lake 
condo. {R. 76-87, First Amended Complaint) 
22. September 4, 2012: Gillman filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to 
remove the Herriman house lien and dismiss the lien foreclosure cause of action. 
{R. 143-152} 
23. September 28, 2012: Gillman submitted a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment for $1,000. 
1-D never responded. (R. 758:8, Declaration of Paul D. Dodd, Attorney For Defendant) 
24. May 2, 2013: Judge Quinn ordered 1-D to show cause why the case should not be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. (R. 243-244, Order to Show Cause) 
12 
• 
• 
• 
25. July 8, 2013: Judge Quinn granted Gillman's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, dismissing the mechanic's lien and foreclosure cause of action on the 
Herriman house, and finding the 1-D in violation of the Mechanic's Lien statute. 
(R. 284-288, Order) 
26. February 7, 2014: The court ordered 1-D to show cause why the case should not 
be dismissed for failure to prosecute the contract claim. Gillman was forced to 
prematurely plead her attorney fees. (R. 294-295, Order to Show Cause: 296-348, 
Defendant's Motion for Order Granting Attorney Fees and Costs) 
27. -+ June 2, 2014: Trial Judge, Richard McKelvie, was assigned the case. See Docket 
28. -+ July 10, 2014: 1-D launched its 'Gillman-fault' theme at the pre-trial conference, 
which would re-litigate the lien issues at trial and overshadow the trial rulings. 
{R. 581-582, Minutes; 967:1-970:9, Transcript) 
29. November 10, 2014: The bench trial was scheduled for one day. 1-D used the 
day for its case-in-chief, taking two-thirds of the time. See Clerk's Index 
30. November 13, 2014: Trial reconvened at 2:00 p.m., concluding at approximately 
4:50 p.m. Gillman presented her case in one hour, 30 minutes and 1-D cross-
examined for one hour, 10 minutes. See Clerk's Index 
31. Post-Trial: 
• November 21, 2014: Gillman written Closing Argument {R. 602-622} 
1-D written Closing Argument (R. 625-644) 
• January 29, 2015: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order {R. 647-658} 
13 
• February 4, 2015: I-D's Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs and Interest {R. 660-
673) 
• February 12, 2015: Gillman's Rule 52 Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (pied entitlement to attorney fees for defeating the 
mechanic's liens) (R. 676-684) 
• March 18, 2015: Ruling and Order on Motion to Amend (denying Gillman's 
Rule 52 Motion) (R. 739-741) 
• April 3, 2015: Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees 
(R. 742-793} 
• June 8, 2015: Order on Motion for Attorney Fees (R. 815-818} 
• June 25, 2015: Gillman's Objection to Proposed Judgment (challenged pre-
judgment interest on attorney fees that 1-D did not plead) (R. 824-828) 
• July 9, 2015: Order Denying Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order {R. 849-
850) 
• July 9, 2015: Judgment (R. 851-853} 
• July 15, 2015: I-D's Application for Amendment ofJudqment (R. 856-869} 
• July 17, 2015: Judgment (ex-parte order, granting I-D's motion to increase 
attorney fees by $5,481.27) (R. 874-876) 
• August 10, 2015: Gillman's Notice of Appeal (R. 879-880} 
Summary of Argument 
I. 1-D filed two mechanic's liens, the first on Gillman's Salt Lake condo, the second 
on her Herriman house. The liens were summarily disposed before trial and 1-D lost 
• 
• 
both of them. Gillman held a statutory right to her attorney fees for defeating them. • 
14 
• 
The mechanic's lien attorney fees would dominate the case, as 1-D sought to escape 
€ii> them, cultivating its 'Gillmanjault' theory: The liens and their significant costs in 
attorney fees were Gillman's fault, for which she should be punished. Starting with the 
pre-trial hearing and extending through the trial, 1-D re-litigated the liens. The liens 
were not relevant to the trial issues but the 'Gillman-fault' theory acutely prejudiced all 
of the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
II. Gillman had a statutory right to attorney fees for defeating both mechanic's liens. 
However, the court adopted I-D's 'Gillman-fault' theory, denied Gillman her attorney 
fees for defeating the liens and awarded 1-D its attorney fees for losing them. The court 
erred in its interpretation of the Mechanic's Lien attorney fee statute in its award of 
fees. 
Ill. The Salt Lake condo lien was filed under the authority of the Mechanic's Lien 
statute, but did not satisfy any of the necessary criteria. A lien that purports to the 
express authority of the Mechanic's Lien statute, but fails its criteria, can be found 
wrongful under the Wrongful Lien statute, and is subject to penalties and attorney fees. 
The Salt Lake condo lien was wrongful under the Wrongful Lien statute. 
IV. The only writing between 1-D and Gillman was a scant work order that included 
no pricing. 1-D advocated only for an express contract at trial and the court's ruling 
followed that advocacy, despite the absence of a price term. The law does not support 
a conclusion of law that a contract is express without the essential price term. Though 
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there was a contract, it was implied-in-fact, not express. I-D's trial burden for a contract 
implied-in-fact was proof that its charges were the reasonable market value. I-D failed 
that burden of proof. 
Argument 
I. Mechanic's lien attorney fees dominated the case, not the underlying 
contract claim. 1-D lost both liens summarily, but re-litigated the issue at 
trial to escape statutory attorney fee liability for the losses. 
I-D filed two mechanic's liens in the case, the first on the Salt Lake condo, the 
second on the Herriman house. Time was the foundation of I-D's 'Gillman-fault' theory: 
Gillman was responsible for the lien debacle and its costs because she did nothing to 
correct I-D before it broke lien law, a premise that depended on the sequence of events: 
• March 11, 2011: I-D worked one day on the Herriman house. 
• June 15, 2011: I-D filed a lien on the Salt Lake condo, where it had never 
worked. 
-+ • Sept. 8, 2011: The 180-day statutory deadline to file a lien expired. 
• Sept. 22, 2011: I-D filed suit to foreclose the Salt Lake condo lien. 
• Nov. 11, 2011: In a letter personally delivered, Gillman requested I-D remove 
the condo lien. 
• Dec. 5, 2011: Gillman filed a Petition to Nullify the Salt Lake condo lien. 
• Dec. 6, 2011: I-D "amended" the condo lien and designated the Herriman 
house. 
• July 8, 2013: Judge Quinn dismissed the Herriman lien on summary 
judgment. Gillman's attorney fees exceeded $12,000. 
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• 
• 
• 
A. I-D's 'Gillman-fault' theory centered on the 180-day statutory time 
limit to file a mechanic's lien under UCA §38-1-3 {Mechanics Lien 
statute}. 
Pivotal to the 'Gillman-fault' theory was the 180-day, statutory deadline 
il governing viability of the mechanic's lien on the Salt Lake condo, and whether Gillman 
was duty-bound to prevent 1-D from violating the statutory limits of lien law. 1-D 
asserted the theory at the pre-trial conference in July 2014, more than 18 months after 
the condo lien was disposed and more than a year after Judge Quinn dismissed the 
Herriman house lien on summary judgment:13 
GIBBS: [w]e filed a lawsuit to foreclose the mechanic's lien. We 
served that on-on, on her then-attorney, it wasn't Mr. Stubbs, it 
his law firm, it was Mr. Dodd. And they looked at it, they have it, 
nobody gave any indication to either myself or my clients, wait a 
second, this lien is on the wrong property. 
Had they have done that, and I think that the history speaks for 
itself, had they have done that, this issue would have been 
resolved and the tail wouldn't be wagging the dog and we 
wouldn't be here today in this scenario. (932:25-933:9} 
-+COURT: You could have corrected it within the statutory time? 
{R. 933:10)14 
-+GIBBS: We could have corrected it and we did ... (R. 933:11) 
II 
II 
13 During this hearing, Gibbs repeatedly referred to the Salt Lake condo as the "Sandy 
property." 
14The hearing transcript does not accurately include the last four words of this sentence. The 
exact text of the court's question above is verbatim, and can be verified at 13.55.05. the time 
stamp on the recording. 
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GIBBS: And yes, Ms. Gillman did provide a letter to 1-D Electric and 
the letter was purposely ambiguous, and it said, you put a lien on 
my property," and, 1-1 won't read the entirety of the letter, but in 
essence, what it said was, you put a lien on my property, this is 
groundless, you need to remove it. (R. 936:23-937:2) 
COURT: Did it identify the property on which the lien was-
(R. 937:3-4) 
GIBBS: No, it did not. And it had her address for the Sandy (sic) 
property right at the top of the letterhead. So 1-D Electric gets this 
and they're, like, why is this a groundless lien, it has her Sandy (sic) 
property listed on the top from her letterhead, doesn't say 
anything about, hey, you liened my Sandy (sic) property, not the 
Herriman property where the work was performed. Had that 
have been the issue, the same thing would have happened that 
happened immediately when they filed their petition to nullify the 
wrongful lien, which is-that one has been corrected. (R. 937:5-14) 
The reason they couldn't do that is because that was still within 
the statutory timeframe to allow 1-D Electric to amend. If they 
had given 1-D Electric notice that it was the wrong property being 
referenced, an amendment could have been made to that 
mechanic's lien and that amended mechanic's lien could have 
been timely foreclosed. But the timing was such that it couldn't 
be referenced, they couldn't let us know, despite the fact that she 
had counsel and we were in communication, nothing was ever 
referenced, because had there have been a reference, had there } 
have been any notification, that lien could have been amended 
timely, and this action would have been proceeding to foreclose 
the Herriman property. (R. 937:15-938:1) (Emphasis added) 
Gibbs' representations to the court were incendiary, but were not the truth. The 
Mechanic's Lien statutory deadline to file or amend had expired Sept. 8, 2011. The 
letter to which Gibbs refers was personally delivered by Gillman to 1-D on Nov. 11, 2011, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
and identified the only mechanic's lien in place at the time, the Salt Lake condo lien. • 
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The letter was dated more than two months past the 180-day deadline. I-D "amended" 
the Salt Lake condo lien to designate the Herriman house on Dec. 6, 2011-three 
months too late. 
The last mechanic's lien had been settled for at least a year before this pre-trial 
date in July 2014 and was no longer relevant to the trial issues remaining, yet I-D 
continued the steady drumbeat that Gillman was responsible for the lien misadventure 
€ii) and its costs because she did not correct I-D's lien before expiration of the statutory 
deadline. Irrespective of its argument that Gillman was derelict of duty for failing to 
legally protect I-D from violating the Mechanic's Lien statute, the 180-day deadline was 
• long past, expiring Sept. 8, 2011, as a matter of law. 
B. Evidence at trial and the court's rulings centered on the 'Gillman-
fau/t' theory. 
The court entered numerous findings of fact that focused on the irrelevant 
mechanic's liens, in the 'Gillman-fault' context: 
1. Kim Olson, I-D's president, directed counsel to file the mechanic's lien because 
"Defendant was trying to intimidate him ... " (R. 650:14, Findings of Fact) 
2. Olson did not notice the lien was on the condo. (R. 651:15, Findings of Fact) 
3. Gillman's Nov. 11, 2011 letter to Olson, requesting removal of the condo lien, 
was "deliberately vague." {R. 651:16, Findings of Fact) The court drew the first tether of 
connection between the mechanic's lien and Gillman's 'scheme' to convert it to a 
wrongful lien: 
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[D]efendant knew that the lien had been placed on the wrong property 
[a]nd intentionally and deliberately failed to mention that fact in the 
letter to Olson [i]n a deliberate effort to establish a cause of action 
against Plaintiff for filing a wrongful lien. (R. 651:17, Findings of Fact) 
{Emphasis added) 
4. Dec. 6, 2011 was Olson's realization that the condo had been liened and he 
ordered it removed immediately. (R. 651:18, Findings of Fact) 
5. Gillman testified she did not receive certified mail from 1-D because she was out 
of town for long periods between March and mid-June 2011. (R. 654:28-29, Findings of • 
Notably, Defendant provided absolutely no evidence indicating the 
dates she was gone, where she was, or the dates she was back in town. 
The inference from her testimony is that she never received the 
notices for the certified mail, is which she did not pick up from the post 
office. Again, the court rejects her testimony. By all observations, 
[D]efendant is a capable, accomplished business-woman who keeps 
meticulous records and appears to retain everything. Any 
documentation of business travel would have been required for 
business and tax purposes, and could have easily been provided to 
the Court in support of her contention that she was gone for the 
entirety of this critical period. The fact that she provided no such 
testimony or documentation [l]eads the Court to conclude that her 
avoidance of these letters was willful rather than circumstantial. 
(R. 654:29, Findings of Fact) (Emphasis added} 
This finding of the court underscores the intense focus on fixing Gillman's fault for not 
discovering the condo lien and correcting 1-D before the Sept. 8th statutory deadline 
expired-the "critical period." No discovery was ever conducted in this case. Trial was 
15 Gillman received the notices for the certified mail, which she produced at trial and submitted 
into evidence during her testimony. (R. Exhibit 26, 1142:12-1143:15; 1147:24-1148:14; 
1368:12-1371:5) 
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the first and only time Gillman was ever questioned about her location during the 
ei> timeframe of the condo lien and foreclosure lawsuit filings. Yet, the court "rejects her 
testimony," extrapolating to conclude that her failure to get the certified mail was 
"willful rather than circumstantial." Gillman produced no travel records at trial because 
nobody had ever asked for anything in discovery. Neither had anybody ever asked for 
an accounting of her whereabouts. Further, the timeframe was only "critical" to the 
€t court if Gillman were responsible in some way for the condo lien. 
• 
• 
• 
6. The court placed categorical blame on Gillman for the mechanic's lien litigation 
expenses, defending 1-D for filing them, then losing them: 
Defendant argues that "approximately half of total attorney fees on 
both sides of this case was spent asserting/defending the unlawful 
lien claims that Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed or summarily lost." 
Although Defendant correctly asserts that many of the fees 
involved the litigation over the mechanic's lien, she is incorrect in 
her assertion that those generated fees are the result of Plaintiff's 
own actions. {R. 815-816:3, Order on Motion For Attorney Fees) 
{Emphasis added) 
7. This finding memorializes the re-trial of the irrelevant mechanic's liens, the court 
belatedly deciding that the lien was not "unlawful," in direct contravention of the 
summary disposal and Judge Quinn's ruling more than 18 months prior: 
First, it must be noted that the Court determined that the lien was 
not "unlawful." Although the lien was filed against the wrong 
property, the Court determined that the errant filing was 
inadvertent and was corrected immediately upon Plaintiff's counsel 
learning of the error. Notwithstanding that correction, Defendant 
insisted on pursuing a cause of action for wrongful lien, both 
through motion for summary judgment and at trial. The 
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mechanic's lien issue became the "tail wagging the dog" in this 
case, and Defendant was relentless in her pursuit of it. (R. 816:5, 
Order on Motion For Attorney Fees} (Emphasis added) 
[t]he Court has previously determined that the driving force 
behind this litigation was Defendant's intractable position that the 
original charges for services were unreasonable, and her steadfast 
determination to take advantage of an inadvertent clerical error 
committed by Plaintiff's counsel. It is extremely doubtful that this 
matter would have extended to a three-day trial16 {or gone to trial 
at all) over the initial claim based on work performed and not paid 
for. Defendant made a strategic decision to take advantage of the 
misplaced lien, not only as a means of avoiding the original debt, 
but as a means of punishing Plaintiff for taking action against her. 
(R. 816:8, Order on Motion For Attorney Fees) (Emphasis added) 
The court's ruling was rigorously congruent to I-D's 'Gillman-fault' theory of the case. 
Indeed, the mechanic's liens were the "tail wagging the dog," but the court imposed on 
Gillman the fault, because she was "relentless in her pursuit of it." 
The court erroneously reverses responsibility for the mechanic's liens. 1-D was 
the perpetrator of the lien calamity and filed the liens, not Gillman. Gillman's counsel 
warned 1-D that "amending" the Salt Lake condo lien to designate the Herriman house 
was illegal and 1-D proceeded anyway-restarting the lien carnage with which these 
courts are still grappling five years later. This case could have been over, and should 
have been over on Dec. 6, 2011, when 1-D 'discovered' its "error." Rather than accept 
responsibility, 1-D aggravated its "error" by "amending" the condo lien and reigniting 
the litigation it would inevitably lose a second time. 
16 The trial did not extend to three days. 1-0 consumed the full day of trial on Nov. 10, 2014. 
Gillman's case was heard Nov. 13, 2014, between 2:00 p.m. and 4:45 p.m. 
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• 
• 
• 
C. The illegality of the mechanic's liens on the Salt Lake condo and 
the Herriman house was already settled. The mechanic's liens 
were not relevant to the trial issues. 
1-D could have appropriately appealed the loss of the mechanic's liens and did not, 
instead choosing a surreptitious means of oblique attack-the 'Gillman-fault' theory. 
Under no auspices of trial province should the mechanic's liens have been re-litigated, 
but they were. 
1-D successfully poisoned the water at the pre-trial hearing with the 'Gillman-
fault' theory of responsibility for the liens. The potency of this prejudicial dye would 
prove devastating to the pure parameters of law in the case, coloring the whole trial and 
its aftermath. I-D's representations were not the truth, but they hit their mark. 
Attorney fees were always the principal battle in the case. The court ultimately agreed 
that 1-D was blameless for the mechanic's lien attorney fee debacle, Gillman was at 
fault, and should be punished accordingly, that punishment taking the form of equitably 
holding her responsible for the massive litigation expenses, including the mechanic's 
liens, the wrongful lien, sua sponte, pre-judgment interest on attorney fees, and an ex-
parte Order that increased the initial judgment by $5,481.27. 
II. Gillman was the successful party on both mechanic's lien claims and 
foreclosure causes of action, defeating both the Salt Lake condo lien and the 
Herriman house lien. Gillman is entitled to statutory attorney fees. 
A. I-D's lien claim and foreclosure cause of action on Gillman's Salt Lake 
condo failed by I-D's own admission, with a voluntary dismissal. 
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Claiming authority under UCA §38-1-3 (Mechanics Lien statute), I-D filed a lien 
against Gillman's Salt Lake condo June 15, 2011, then filed suit to foreclose the lien 
Sept. 22, 2011, followed by a lis pendens on Nov. 2, 2011. (R. 1-8, Complaint; Exhibit 10: 
15-16, Notice of Lis Pendens) The Salt Lake condo lien was not authorized by UCA §38-1-3 
because I-D provided neither construction service nor materials, the necessary 
prerequisites under the law. The related lis pendens was unlawful. 
• 
Gillman answered I-D's foreclosure complaint Dec. 5, 2011. {R. 17-31, Verified • 
Answer and Counter Petition to Nullify) On Dec. 6, 2011, I-D "amended" the Salt Lake 
condo lien, essentially implementing a voluntary dismissal of the mechanic's lien and 
second cause of action in the initial Complaint. I-D released the lis pendens the same 
day. 
B. I-D's lien claim and foreclosure cause of action on Gillman's Herriman 
house failed on a Summary Judgment Motion. 
I-D's Dec. 6, 2011 "amendment" to the Salt Lake condo lien substituted the 
Herriman house, again claiming authority under UCA §38-1-3, the Mechanics Lien 
statute. (R. Exhibit 16) The Herriman house lien was three months past the 180-day 
statutory deadline, which had expired Sept. 8, 2011. On Dec. 19, 2011, I-D filed its First 
Amended Complaint, designating the Herriman house in its second cause of action, 
foreclosure of the mechanic's lien. (R. 76-87} Gillman filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, challenging the Herriman house lien under UCA §38-1-3 as 
unlawful, I-D's claimed statutory authority. (R. 143-152} 
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• 
On July 8, 2013, Judge Quinn entered an order granting Gillman's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, dismissing the Herriman house lien, together with I-D's 
second cause of action, foreclosure of that lien, and finding 1-D in violation of lien law. 
(R. 284-288, Order) 
C. 1-D claimed authority under UCA §38-1-3, the Mechanic's Lien statute, 
for both the Salt Lake condo lien and the Herriman house lien. The 
statute provides the right to attorney fees for the successful party, 
§38-1-18. 
UCA §38-1-18 is the mechanic's lien attorneys' fee statute, which states: 
[i]n any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' 
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
(Emphasis added) 
This court has clearly delineated the meaning of "successful party," as it is 
specified in the statute: 
"[A] 'successful party [under Utah Code section 38-1-18] includes 
one who successfully enforces or defends against a lien action. 111 
Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 UT App 335, '19, 991 P.2d 1113 (Internal 
citations omitted; emphasis added) 
Applying the legislative intent of the mechanic's lien attorney fee statute, this 
court has conveyed unequivocal guidance for awarding fees to the successful party: 
[t] he provision mandates that the successful party be allowed to 
recover reasonable attorney fees. . .[c]ourts do not have 
discretion to decide whether to award reasonable attorney fees to 
the "successful party." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. 
Guy, 2004 UT 47, '17, 94 P.3d 270 (Internal citations omitted; 
emphasis added) 
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I-D's voluntary dismissal of the Salt Lake condo lien does not relieve its liability 
for Gillman's attorney fees, as the court clarified in this recent mechanic's lien case: 
The fact that the [plaintiff] recognized the apparent weakness of its 
claim and voluntarily dismissed it before the district court had an 
opportunity to do [so] likewise does not relieve the [plaintiff] of its 
obligation to reimburse the [defendants] for their attorney fees. 
Any other rule would be fundamentally unfair to those 
defendants who are required to incur substantial fees defending a 
plaintiff's non-meritorious claims up to the point of the plaintiff's 
voluntary dismissal. Lane Myers Constr., LLC v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., f/11, 2012 UT App 269 (Emphasis added) 
D. The trial court's ruling on attorney fees does not conform to the Mechanic's 
Lien statute or established precedent. 
In its trial ruling, the court expressed its overall perspective on attorney fees, 
relative to the outcome of the case, assimilating the 'Gillman-fault' theory in its 
reasoning:17 
The Court has found against Defendant on the breach of contract 
claim, and has similarly ruled against Defendant on her wrongful 
lien claim. The Court has recognized no cause of action for which 
Defendant may be entitled to fees. 
[i]t is clear, and the court finds, that the expenses in this case, born 
by both parties, have been exacerbated by Defendant's continued 
and unreasonable efforts to avoid paying a contractual obligation, 
and by attempting to use Plaintiff's harmless (and arguably 
beneficial, to Defendant) error to create a wrongful lien cause of 
action. It is therefore appropriate that Defendant bear the costs 
of Plaintiff's fees as well as her own. (R. 657:43-658:44, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order) (Emphasis added) 
17 The trial court integrated its trial ruling, Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order (R. 
647-658) with its Order On Motion For Attorney's Fees (R. 815-817). The two are inseparable in 
the court's interrelated reasoning for awarding attorney fees. 
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In response to the trial ruling, Gillman filed a Rule 52 Motion to Amend Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to reflect entitlement to attorney fees for successfully 
defeating the two mechanic's liens and foreclosure causes of action, fully briefing the 
court on the Mechanic's Lien attorney fee statute and relevant precedent. (R. 676-684} 
The court denied Gill man's motion, without explanation. (R. 739-741, Ruling and Order on 
Motion to Amend) 
In its motion for attorney fees, 1-D did not segregate amounts between issues it 
won and lost, though that may not have influenced the court's general appraisal of 
attorney fee rights, which consolidated all issues beneath the 'Gillman-fault' canopy: 
Plaintiff seeks fees in the amount of $29,144, and costs in the 
amount of $465.32. Defendant argues that "approximately half of 
total attorney fees on both sides of this case was spent 
asserting/defending the unlawful lien claims that Plaintiff 
voluntarily dismissed or summarily lost." Although Defendant 
correctly asserts that many of the fees involved the litigation over 
the mechanic's lien, she is incorrect in her assertion that those 
generated fees are the result of Plaintiff's own actions. (R. 815-
816:4, Order on Motion For Attorney Fees) (Emphasis added) 
First, it must be noted that the Court determined that the lien was 
not "unlawful." Although the lien was filed against the wrong 
property, the Court determined that the errant filing was 
inadvertent and was corrected immediately upon Plaintiff's counsel 
learning of the error. Notwithstanding that correction, Defendant 
insisted on pursuing a cause of action for wrongful lien, both 
through motion for summary judgment and at trial. The 
mechanic's lien issue became the "tail wagging the dog" in this 
case, and Defendant was relentless in her pursuit of it. (R. 816:5, 
Order on Motion For Attorney Fees) (Emphasis added) 
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This irreconcilable tangle that combined the mechanic's liens with the wrongful 
lien and contract claims was justification for penalizing Gillman with the attorney fees in 
the case on an equitable analysis, weighing the composite of issues against each other 
to reach an equilibrium among all of them for fixing relative "fault" across the horizon 
of the whole case-that 'fault' lying squarely at Gillman's feet, because she was 
"relentless in her pursuit of" the lien litigation that produced the immense attorney 
fees. 
This analytical methodology is not faithful to UCA §38-1-18, the Mechanic's Lien 
attorney fee statute. There is no license in the precepts of this statute for an equitable 
attorney fee interpretation. The mechanic's liens were not relevant at trial, and there is 
no stretch of reasoning that can logically combine the mechanic's liens with the contract 
and wrongful lien issues in the award of attorney fees. The trial court does not have 
discretion in deciding whether to award attorney fees to the successful party defending 
against a mechanic's lien; neither can the trial court bend the statute to an equitable 
standard of evaluation for the award. 
The mechanic's liens were discrete matters that were settled long before trial 
and 1-D lost both of them. Gillman won summarily and decisively. UCA §38-1-18 is 
explicit and precedent is indisputable: Attorney fees are mandated for the successful 
party and Gillman is entitled to them. The trial court erred in denying Gillman her fees 
for successfully defending against the liens, and awarding 1-D its fees for losing them. 
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Ill. The Salt Lake condo lien 1-D filed under authority of UCA §38-1-3, the 
Mechanic's Lien statute, was wrongful under UCA §38-9-1, the Wrongful 
Lien statute. 
The trial court ruled in its conclusion of law that the Salt Lake condo lien was not 
wrongful: 
[t]he lien here is not "wrongful" under the wrongful lien act. A lien 
is not "wrongful" because it is inaccurate or misidentifies the 
property it seeks to encumber. The lien is "authorized by statute" 
which takes it out of the definition of a wrongful lien. As the 
Hutter Court explained, a lien that is ultimately proved 
unenforceable is not a wrongful lien by virtue of that fact alone. 
(R. 657:39, Conclusions of Law) 
A. 1-D violated the Mechanic's Lien statute, UCA §38-1-3, on the Salt 
Lake condo lien. 
1-D claimed to authority for the condo lien under the Mechanic's Lien statute, 
UCA §38-1-3. (R. Exhibit 10) However, 1-D never provided either service or materials to 
the property, the requisite 'entitlement' criterion to satisfy the law. While the condo 
lien purported to authority under the statute, it failed on its face, subjecting it to the 
scrutiny of UCA §38-9-1, the Wrongful Lien statute. 
B. 1-D violated the Wrongful Lien statute, UCA §38-9-1, on the Salt Lake 
condo lien. 
The Wrongful Lien statute, UCA §38-9-2(3), specifies that wrongful liens are those· 
not expressly authorized by UCA §38-1-3, the Mechanic's Lien statute: 
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under 
Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, 
Mechanics Liens. (Emphasis added) 
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The Wrongful Lien statute does not automatically prohibit any mechanic's lien 
from being wrongful. It only prohibits a mechanic's lien filed by "a person entitled to a 
lien" under the authority of UCA §38-1-3. The distinction is in the 'entitlement' 
provision. If there is authority for entitlement to a lien under UCA §38-1-3, that lien 
cannot be wrongful. However, a lien can be wrongful if it purports to qualify under the 
entitlement provision of UCA §38-1-3, but does not have that authority. The 
• 
'entitlement' provision resides in the solitary requirement that construction services be <t 
provided on real property: 
.. . a person who performs preconstruction service or construction 
service on or for real property has a lien on the real property for 
the reasonable value of the preconstruction service or construction 
service .. (Emphasis added) 
I-D's lien on the condo failed the first precondition of the Mechanic's Lien 
statute. Failing 'entitlement' was fatal from the outset under UCA §38-9-1, and the 
definitions specify the bases for a wrongful lien and set the timeframe for their 
evaluation: 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a 
lien, notice of interest, or encumbrance on an owner's interest in 
certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal 
statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or iudgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the 
owner of the real property. (Emphasis added) 
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The statute is clear that interpretation of "wrongful" does not extend beyond the 
face of the lien document itself, "at the time it is recorded." I-D's Notice of Mechanic's 
Lien on the condo claimed authority under UCA §38-1-3, but satisfied none of its 
conditions in any particular, relegating it to a wrongful lien under UCA §38-9-1 for that 
reason-it was not legitimate on its face. 
The appellate benches have taken considerable notice of the confusion that has 
arisen in interpreting the Wrongful Lien statute, consistently advancing the articulation 
of exactly why a property lien, claimed under authority of the Mechanic's Lien statute, 
UCA §38-1-3, can be found wrongful under UCA §38-9-1, the Wrongful Lien statute. 
Beginning in 2008, the Court of Appeals published dicta on the cohesion: 
The Wrongful Lien statute declares: This chapter does not apply to 
a person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who files a lien 
pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens. Thus, the statute 
is not so broad as to exempt any filing that purports to arise under 
the mechanics' lien statute. Instead, section 38-9-2(3) only 
excludes persons "entitled" to a mechanics' lien. Foothill Park, LC 
v. Judston, Inc., UT App. 113, f[19, 182 P.3d 924 (2008) (Internal 
quotations, citations omitted; emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court decided Hutter v. Dig-It in 2009. The contractor followed the 
Mechanic's Lien statute perfectly when filing its lien against the Hutters, but then did 
not follow the rules of the state construction registry. The lien was valid under the 
statutory authority of UCA §38-1-3, but unenforceable for its failure under construction 
registry rules. The Hutters pied the lien as wrongful because it was unenforceable and 
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the trial court agreed. The Supreme Court disagreed, identifying these core terms: 
• expressly authorized by statute 
• unenforceable 
• wrongful 
Therefore, we conclude that the phrase "not expressly authorized 
by [s]tatute" in the Wrongful Lien Act does not include statutorily 
created liens that ultimately prove unenforceable. Because Dig-It 
filed a mechanic's lien, which is expressly authorized by statute, 
the lien, though unenforceable for the reasons stated above, is not 
wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Injunction Act. Hutter v. Dig-It, 
2009 UT 69, f/52, 219 P.3d 918 (Emphasis added) 
When Dig-It filed the lien against the Hutters, the lien document followed the 
criteria governing its creation under the Mechanic's Lien statute. Hence, it was 
"expressly authorized by statute." Thereafter, Dig-It lost enforcement capacity of the 
lien for not following the state construction registry rules. Losing enforcement capacity 
• 
• 
• 
did not change the statutory authority underlying creation of the lien. The lien was still ce 
"expressly authorized by statute," but was now "unenforceable." Did that make the lien 
"wrongful"? The Supreme Court's answer was, "No." The Supreme Court's explanation 
drew together in this dictum, the relationship between the core terms and "wrongful": 
A lien cannot be "wrongful" if it is "expressly authorized by statute." That "express" 
authority is molded by following the exact criteria of statute when the lien is created. 
Once extant, "express" authority cannot be eradicated, even If the lien proves 
unenforceable for other reasons. Liens created under "express" statutory authority 
cannot be wrongful. However, liens created without "express" statutory authority can 
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be wrongful. 'Failing authority' and 'failing enforcement' are two distinctly different 
concepts. 'Failing authority' can be wrongful. 'Failing enforcement' cannot. The Hutter 
lien failed enforcement, not authority. It was not wrongful. 
In June 2014, the appellate court distinguished that holding in Bay Harbor LC v. 
Sumsion. If a lien claimant has no plausible claim to the property that is liened, the 
Court may declare the lien wrongful under the Wrongful Lien statute, even if it purports 
<i> to fall into the category of a statutory lien, but fails express authority (quoted in part): 
This is not to say that a lien claimant may escape the reach of the 
Wrongful Lien Act simply by alleging that his or her lien is 11 expressly 
authorized by statute." See Hutter, 2009 UT 69, fl 52, 219 P.3d 918. 
(I .. . [i]f a lien claimant has no plausible claim to the property that is 
the subiect of the lien, a court may declare the lien wrongful 
under the Wrongful Lien Act even if it purports to be one falling 
into the category of statutorily authorized liens. Bay Harbor Farm, 
LC v. Sumsion, 2014 UT App 133, 329, f/12, P.3d (Emphasis added) 
This holding was reconfirmed October 30, 2014 in Total Restoration, Inc. v. 
Merritt, a decision through which the appellate court gave this guidance (quoted in 
part): 
[w]e also address Total Restoration's argument that because 
mechanics' liens are authorized by statute, "mechanics' liens, 
without exception, are never wrongful liens." 
[l]f the claimant has no plausible basis for recording a statutory 
lien, a court may declare the lien wrongful under the Wrongful 
Lien Act even if it purports to be one falling into the category of 
statutorily authorized liens. Total Restoration, Inc. v. Merritt, 338, 
f/18, P.3d 836, 841 (Utah App. 2014) (Internal citations omitted; 
emphasis added) 
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I-D's Notice of Lien on the Salt Lake condo was wrongful on its face. The lien 
purported to authority under UCA §38-1-3, the Mechanic's Lien statute, but followed 
none of its criteria. The condo lien 'failed authority'. 1-D never had a statutory right to 
this lien and no plausible basis for filing it. The direction of the appellate benches is that 
such a lien can be found wrongful under UCA §38-9-1, the Wrongful Lien statute. 
UCA §38-9-4 formulates the liability for filing a wrongful lien, and 
calculates the damages due the aggrieved property owner (Emphasis added): 
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as 
defined in Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of 
the county recorder against real property is liable to a record 
interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused by 
the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of Subsection (1) refuses to release or 
correct the wrongful lien within ten days from the date of 
written request from a record interest holder of the real 
property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known 
address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record 
interest holder for $3,000 or for treble actual damages, 
whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and 
costs. 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for 
$10,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and 
for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who records or files or 
causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the 
real property, knowing or having reason to know that the 
document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
34 
• 
The Salt Lake condo lien failed authority under the statue. When I-D filed, it 
@ unquestionably knew, or should have known, that it was wrongful, or groundless, or 
contained a material misstatement or false claim. I-D had to know that it never worked 
on the Salt Lake condo and had no right to file a lien under the "express" authority of 
the statute. 
On Nov. 11, 2011, Defendant personally delivered to I-D, written notice that the 
lien and lis pendens were legally baseless, requesting that both be removed from the 
property. I-D did not remove either before the 10-day time limit. 
There are two tiers to the statutory penalties of UCA §38-9-4. The lesser penalty 
of $3,000 depends on whether the property owner provided written notice to the lien 
claimant, requesting removal of the lien-notice that Gillman personally delivered to I-D 
on Nov. 11, 2011. I-D did not remove the lien until Dec. 6, 2011, almost a month later. 
By clear, black-letter law, I-D is liable for at least the $3,000 penalty. 
The greater penalty of $10,000 is assessed against the lien claimant if the lien is 
wrongful, or groundless, or contains a material misstatement or false claim. Only one of 
these statutory conditions is necessary to justify the penalty. I-D's Notice of Lien, on its 
face at the time it was recorded, met all three, justifying the $10,000 statutory penalty. 
Both penalty tiers provide entitlement to attorney fees. 
The court's findings and conclusions on the wrongful lien issue centered in the 
'Gillman-fault' theory, not the principles of statute or precedent. The court judged 
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Gillman's Nov. 11, 2011 letter to 1-D, which conformed exactly to UCA §38-9-4(2), as a 
carefully calculated conspiracy that created the wrongful lien: 
[D]efendant knew that the lien had been placed on the wrong 
property [a]nd intentionally and deliberately failed to mention that 
fact in the letter to Olson [i]n a deliberate effort to establish a 
cause of action against Plaintiff for filing a wrongful lien. (R. 651:17, 
Findings of Fact) {Emphasis added) 
Gillman knew there was a lien on the condo. However, no reading of the 
statutory scheme can be construed to a conclusion of law that the property owner 
aggrieved by a mechanic's lien can convert that lien to "wrongful." Only the lien 
claimant has control of whether a lien is wrongful or not-control that is asserted when 
the lien is created, at the time it is recorded. 1-D initiated the wrongful lien on the Salt 
Lake condo when it filed a lien that 'failed authority' under the Mechanic's Lien statute. 
The court's censure of Gillman was tainted with the common 
statutory/enforcement confusion that frequently intermingles in the analysis of 
wrongful liens: 
[r]ealizing Plaintiffs error in filing the lien, Defendant made a 
determined effort to capitalize on that error to her advantage. 
Clearly, Defendant suffered no harm from the misplaced lien, and 
her "lying in wait" strategy had at least one positive effect . . .It 
made the lien unenforceable, and the delay created a legal 
impediment to Plaintiff's filing of a subsequent lien on the correct 
property. (R. 657:41, Conclusions of Law) (Emphasis added) 
The court does not recognize that the Salt Lake condo lien failed the "express" 
authority of the Mechanic's Lien statute from the outset. Without authority, • 
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"enforcement" of the condo lien could never become an issue. Casting the facts into a 
• complicit, "lying in wait" framework, the court chastises Gillman for a "delay" that 
"created a legal impediment" preventing I-D from "filing of a subsequent lien on the 
correct property." Once again overlapping the unrelated facts of the Herriman lien and 
the condo lien, within the 'Gillman-fault' theory, the court upbraids Gillman for failing to 
correct I-D before it broke lien law. Gillman never persuaded the court that it was not 
her legal responsibility to protect I-D from itself. Neither did the court ever grasp that 
even if it were, the reality of statute made intercession hopeless: The 180-day 
statutory deadline expired Sept. 8th , as a matter of law, two months before the Nov. 11th 
letter. 
The court's ruling went further in its criticism of Gillman for 'trapping' I-D into a 
wrongful lien, introducing obligations that are neither contained within, nor plausibly 
inferred from, the statute: 
[D]efendant knew or reasonably should have known that any such 
letter authored or signed by her counsel and directed to Plaintiff's 
counsel, would by ethical standards be required to contain more 
particularity regarding the factual or legal inadequacies of the 
mechanic's lien. [i]t becomes even more clear that it was 
intentionally vague in an attempt to lay a trap for improper or 
wrongful lien. (R. 655:32, Conclusions of Law) (Emphasis added) 
Whether Gillman educated I-D to the "legal inadequacies of the mechanic's lien" 
could not have made any difference to its validity. The statute had been expired for two 
• months. Neither was it possible for Gillman to "trap" I-D into a wrongful lien on the 
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condo. 1-D achieved that independently when it filed the lien June 15th without express 
authority. 
Parallel to I-D's 'Gillman-fault' contentions, the court leveled charges of ethical 
misconduct, as further verification that Gillman sought to "set up" a wrongful lien: 
Defendant is admittedly trained in the law [H]er suggestion that 
she and her counsel determined that in order to be effective the 
letter would have to be delivered directly by her to Plaintiff is not 
only an invalid legal conclusion, it is an improper one. She and her 
counsel both knew that Plaintiff was represented by counsel, and 
presumably her counsel knew, if she did not, that direct 
communication with a represented party in (sic) a violation of the 
Canons of Ethics. The Court finds that Defendant's decision to 
deliver the letter personally, whether on advice of counsel or not, 
was a deliberate attempt to obscure the reason she believed the 
lien was improper, and thereby set up a claim of wrongful lien. 
(R. 655:32, Findings of Fact) (Emphasis added) 
This ethical principle has already been precisely treated by this court in a 
wrongful lien case. Plaintiff, Centennial, was the (LLC entity) lienholder. The property 
owner, Vanessa, delivered notice to Centennial's counsel, initiating debate on the bench 
for whether this departure from statutory edict conformed to the law: 
Vanessa argues that requiring the request to remove the lien to be 
delivered directly to Centennial would violate rule 4.2(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. See Utah R. Prof'I Conduct 
4.2(a). On the contrary, a decision that the notice is invalid would 
comport with rule 4.2(a), which states: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the 
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has 
the consent of the other lawyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an 
attorney may, without such prior consent, communicate with 
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another's client if authorized to do so by any law, rule, or court 
order .... 
Id. (emphasis added). Rule 4.2(a) expressly provides that a lawyer 
may communicate with a party if authorized to do so by law. The 
wrongful lien statute's requirement that a request for release of a 
lien be delivered personally to the lien claimant specifically 
authorizes such a communication between a lawyer and a party. 
As such, rule 4.2 is not an ethical impediment to compliance with 
the notice provisions of the wrongful lien statute. Centennial Inv. 
Co., LLC v. Nuttall, UT App 321, 1121, 171 P.3d 458 (Emphasis 
original) 
Gillman's notice to 1-D conformed to the statutory requirement that delivery be 
accomplished directly between property owner and lien claimant, which did not violate 
any rule of professional conduct, and certainly did not "set up" the wrongful lien. 
Lost in this overwhelming preoccupation with 'Gillman-fault' were the grounding 
principles of mechanic's lien law and wrongful lien law. 1-D never had statutory 
entitlement to a lien on the Salt Lake condo, which was clear on the face of the lien 
document the day it was recorded. The lien was wrongful on its face for 'failing 
Ci> authority'. Gillman requested removal of the lien, which 1-D did not accomplish within 
the 10-day statutory time, subjecting itself to the first tier of legislated penalty. 1-D 
knew, or should have known, that the lien was wrongful, or groundless, or contained a 
material misstatement or false claim. In fact, the lien was wrongful, and groundless, 
and contained a material misstatement or false claim, subjecting 1-D to the second tier 
of legislated penalty. The law authorizes both penalty tiers and attorney fees to Gillman 
for the wrongful lien on the Salt Lake condo. 
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IV. 1-D failed its contract burden of proof. 
A. The trial court's conclusion of law, that there was an express 
contract between 1-D and Gillman, was erroneous. 
At trial, 1-D advocated only for an express contract, which the court adopted in its 
conclusions of law: 
Plaintiff claims, and the Court finds, that there was a binding 
contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. The necessary elements 
are present. (R. 655:33, Conclusions of Law) (Emphasis added} 
There is clearly a meeting of the minds. Plaintiff expected to be 
paid for the work and materials provided, and Defendant clearly 
expected to pay. Although the exact costs and work were not 
confirmed at the outset, Defendant was well-versed in 
construction contracts, and knew to expect that she would be 
billed for both supplies and labor. The fact that she expressed 
dissatisfaction about the amount billed does not diminish the fact 
that she undertook a responsibility to pay. Moreover, she signed 
the work order, which had been substantially completed (albeit 
without prices) at the time. (R. 655-656:34, Conclusions of Law) 
(Emphasis added) 
Consistent with its ruling that the contract was express, the court awarded 1-D its 
full charges of $1,827.61 in damages, together with 24% in pre-judgment interest, for a 
total of $3,393.09. 
B. Without a price term, there was no express contract. 
While the court specifically recognized that there was no agreement for price, it 
nevertheless concluded there was a "meeting of the minds" forming a binding contract. 
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This conclusion of law does not align with the long history of contract precedent in 
i) Utah: 
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract is that 
there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be 
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient 
• definiteness to be enforced. Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 
P.2d 427, 428 /1961) (Emphasis added) 
[A] meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement 
is essential to the formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be 
@ enforced if its terms are indefinite. Nielsen v. Gold's Gvm, 2003 UT 
37, f/11, 78 P.3d 600 (Emphasis added) 
The crux of this contract dispute was the price. There was never agreement for a 
• price, a conclusion the court also included in its ruling. Without that agreement, there 
was no price term to enforce and the court erred in selecting I-D's arbitrary calculation 
of charges as the proxy term for a binding contract. 
C. I-D's sole contractual claim lay in quantum meruit. 
In its First Amended Complaint, 1-D pied three causes of action: 
• Breach of contract 
• Lien foreclosure 
• Quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, and/or quantum meruit 
1-D clearly contemplated that the alternative to a "price," under a binding 
contract was the "reasonable" amount 11equal to the value" of the services in quantum 
meruit: 
If for any reason the trier-of-fact in this case fails to identify the 
existence of an enforceable and binding contract [P]laintiff asserts 
an alternative claim for quasi contract, unjust enrichment and/or 
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quantum meruit. (R. 81:25, First Amended Complaint) {Emphasis 
added) 
Plaintiff performed electrical services for Gillman and thereby 
conferred a benefit upon Gillman with a reasonable expectation of 
being compensated in an amount equal to the value of such 
services. (R. 81:24, First Amended Complaint) {Emphasis added) 
Olson testified that the I-D charges were "a lot of money." (R. 1190:23} But he 
said, "[t]he bill I thought was already fair and reasonable." (R. 1218:7-8) 
Gillman tried many times to settle this dispute without protracted litigation and ~ 
has always acknowledged that she owes the reasonable value of I-D's services, a fact 
substantiated by the: 
• Answer to First Amended Complaint {R. 127:12) 
• Remittance copy of I-D's March 24th invoice that Gillman mailed 
back to I-D, asking for the labor allocation (R. Exhibit 4, p. 2} 
• May 6, 2011 letter to 1-D that ended with Gillman's offer that she 
was "willing to pay a realistic amount for the work that was done, 
but no more. Please recalculate it." (R. Exhibit 6, p. 2} 
• Repeated trial testimony {1168:3-9; 1169:1-13; 1367:2-9; 1372:24-
1374:10; 1399:16-19} 
Without an express contract, I-D's contract alternative was quantum meruit. 
There has never been a dispute that I-D provided services, or that Gillman expected to 
pay for them. The only dispute was the reasonable amount due. The seminal case in 
Utah on the doctrine of quantum meruit is Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
Davies is very similar to this case. Davies built duplexes for the defendants, 
Olson, et al. Olson requested the services. Davies and Olson agreed the duplexes would 
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be constructed for cost, plus $6,000 profit/each. A written contract was prepared, but 
~ never signed. When one of the duplexes sold, the price did not satisfy the outstanding 
construction loan and litigation began to recover the difference. In adjudicating that 
difference, the trial court found no meeting of the minds on price; hence, there was no 
contract. 
On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's finding of no enforceable contract, 
8 for lack of a price term. The court took occasion to clarify quantum meruit, dividing the 
principal into two branches (quoted in part): 
• 
[c]onfusion surrounds the use and application of quantum meruit 
because courts have used the term quantum meruit, contract 
implied in fact, contract implied in law, quasi contract, unjust 
enrichment, and/or restitution without analytical precision. Id. at 
268 [Citations omitted] 
Contract implied in law, also known as quasi-contract or unjust 
enrichment, is one branch of quantum meruit. A quasi-contract is 
not a contract at all, but rather is a legal action in restitution. Id. at 
269 [Citations omitted] 
A contract implied in fact is the second branch of quantum meruit. 
A contract implied in fact is a "contract" established by conduct. 
The elements of a contract implied in fact are: (1) the defendant 
requested the plaintiff to perform work; (2) the plaintiff expected 
the defendant to compensate him or her for those services; and (3) 
the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff 
expected compensation. Id. [Citation omitted] 
Technically, recovery in contract implied in fact is the amount the 
parties intended as the contract price. If that amount is 
unexpressed, courts will infer that the parties intended the 
amount to be the reasonable market value of the plaintiff's 
services. Id. [Citation omitted; emphasis added] 
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I-D's sole remedy was quantum meruit, under a contract implied-in-fact that 
lacked agreement on price. Gillman requested the work, expected to pay for it, and 1-D 
expected to be paid. Inasmuch as the price was never agreed, the court must infer the 
amount was the reasonable market value of I-D's work. 
D. 1-D had the burden of proof for establishing the reasonable market 
value of the material and service it provided. 
Corresponding to the Davies facts, 1-D did not have an express contract with a 
price term. 1-D provided material and service. Gillman accepted the benefits and has 
admitted throughout that she is obligated to pay their reasonable value. The burden of 
proof for value is upon the party asserting quantum meruit. See Zitterkopf v. Bradbury, 
783 P.2d 1142 (Wyo. 1989); Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1160 (Wyo. 1982). 
E. 1-D did not prove the reasonable market value of its charges. 
The court succinctly summarized the substance of evidence 1-D presented to 
prove its express contract case: 
Plaintiff substantially performed the terms of the contract. [the] 
Court found that the electricians provided by Plaintiff were 
continuously and properly engaged in the work for which they 
were employed. [D]efendant engaged the services of trained 
electricians, and had to know that they would be compensated the 
same amount (as Olson testified) for changing a light bulb as for 
replacing a circuit box or performing some other sophisticated 
procedure. (R. 656:35, Conclusions of Law) (Emphasis added) 
Whether the crew was "continuously and properly engaged" does not translate 
to a computation for the reasonable market value of what was accomplished all day. 1-D 
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did not make that translation, and the court profoundly begs that salient question in its 
assumption that Gillman "had to know that they would be compensated the same 
amount [f]or changing a light bulb as for replacing a circuit box or performing some 
other sophisticated procedure." Indeed, Gillman did not know-the very reason the law 
requires reasonable market reconciliation of a demand for payment at an excessive 
price that was never agreed: No reasonable person hires a crew of three professional 
electricians to change light bulbs at $165/hr.18 Gillman does not dispute the court's 
account of I-D's evidence, that the crew was "continuously and properly engaged." It is a 
fair and comprehensive synopsis of I-D's "proof." However, it was I-D's burden to prove 
that the $1,827.61 it charged for being "continuously and properly engaged" was the 
reasonable market value of the work. 1-D did not do it. 
F. The only evidence in the record for the reasonable market value 
of I-D's services is between $600 and $700, evidence adduced at 
trial by 1-D. 
1-D bore the burden of proving the basis of their complaint-quantum meruit, or 
the reasonable market value of the services provided to Gillman. The only evidence 
adduced at trial was derived during I-D's case-in-chief in its examination of Gillman. To 
Plaintiff's direct question of the reasonable value for its services, Gillman testified that 
she sought the opinions of two other electricians for an assessment of I-D's work, one of 
which was $600, the other was $700. {R. 1137:6-1138:2; 1372:4-23} As a comparative 
18 1-D charged the journeyman electrician @ $65/hr.; the other two were each billed @ $50/hr., 
totaling $165/hr. (R. Exhibit 2) 
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ratio, Gillman also testified that she engaged another electrician to complete moving 
the garage attic wires that 1-D did not finish in preparation for the flooring, as well as 
everything else remaining inside the house. She paid $650 (labor only) for everything, 
which she evaluated as five times more work than 1-D accomplished. (R. 1372:4-23; 
406:21, Affidavit of Defendant) Though 1-D had ample opportunity during trial, taking two-
thirds of the time, Gillman's was the only testimony, which 1-D presented to the Court, 
regarding the reasonable market value of I-D's services, and was between $600 and 
$700. 
The court erred in its conclusion of law that there was an express contract. I-D's 
basis of recovery was an implied-in-fact contract in quantum meruit, as this court 
explained in Davies, and 1-D identified as an alternative in its First Amended Complaint. 
(R. 81:25). The trial record can only devolve to the evidence available-Gillman's 
testimony that two independent electricians determined the reasonable market value 
was between $600 and $700. 
G. Gillman should be awarded her trial attorney fees, for I-D's failure to 
meet its burden of proof. 
1. The court awarded 1-D all of its trial attorney fees. 
I-D's work order includes a provision to recover attorney fees in any collection 
action for its charges: "Purchaser agrees to pay all costs and expenses including 
reasonable attorney's fees in the event collection becomes necessary." (R. Exhibit 2) 
The court was authorized to award attorney fees: 
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Where the parties have agreed by contract to the payment of 
attorney fees, the court may award reasonable fees in accordance 
with the terms of the parties' agreement. Trayner v. Cushing, 688 
P.2d, 858 (Utah 1984) 
The court invited 1-D to apply for attorney fees, then awarded 1-D all of its trial 
attorney fees, and approximately 75% of its pre-trial fees-all of which was expended in 
the lien battle. 
The Court has determined that Plaintiff prevails in its breach of 
contract claim. The contract itself has a provision for attorney's 
fees. In its written argument, Plaintiff has not claimed an amount 
for attorney fees, but has not waived the right to do so. The Court 
finds that Plaintiff may be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in 
this matter, and directs Plaintiff to submit a proposed order 
regarding attorney's fees. (R. 657:42, Conclusions of Law) {Emphasis 
added) 
Gillman filed a Rule 52 motion, pleading the court award her attorney fees for 
defeating the mechanic's liens, which the court denied. {R. 676-684, Rule 52 Motion to 
Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; R. 739-741, Ruling and Order on Motion to 
Amend). Gillman objected to I-D's motion for fees, which did not segregate fees for 
issues won or lost, and addressed none of the "reasonableness" factors of precedent. 
{R. 742-793, Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees) I-D's motion for 
fees did no more than outline claimed fees and interest, with billing records appended. 
{R. 660-673, Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs and Interest) The court entered no findings, 
beyond the reiteration that Gillman was at fault for the total of the litigation expenses, 
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"the lien was not 'unlawful,"'19 and Gillman tried to manipulate the mechanic's lien to 
create a wrongful lien cause of action: 
Moreover, it is clear, and the court finds, that the expenses in this 
case, born by both parties, have been exacerbated by Defendant's 
continued and unreasonable efforts to avoid paying a contractual 
obligation, and by attempting to use Plaintiff's harmless (and 
arguably beneficial, to Defendant) error to create a wrongful lien 
cause of action. It is therefore appropriate that Defendant bear 
the costs of Plaintiff's fees as well as her own. (R. 815:3, Order On 
Motion For Attorney Fees) (Emphasis added) 
The court awarded 1-D over $25,997 for attorney fees and costs, with interest at 
24%. (R. 817:10-12, Order On Motion For Attorney Fees) Sua sponte, and over Gillman's 
objection, the court's Judgment awarded 1-D pre-judgment interest on attorney fees. (R. <iij) 
851-853, Judgment) Thereafter, the court entered an ex parte order, awarding 1-D 
additional attorney fees of $5,481.27, raising the total judgment to $36,939.29. (R. 874-
876, Judgment) 
2. The Reciprocal Fee statute, UCA §788-5-826, gives the court 
discretion to award attorney fees and costs. 
Utah's Reciprocal Fee statute, UCA §788-5-826, is specific to its intent for 
extending attorney fee rights to all parties under a contract: 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that 
prevails in a civil action based upon any [w]ritten contract, or other 
writing, [w]hen the provisions of the [c]ontract [a]llow at least one 
party to recover attorney fees. 
19(R. 816:5, Order On Motion For Attorney Fees) 
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The court exercised that discretion in this case, granting 1-D all of the fees, costs 
iJ and interest it pied, pre-judgment interest it did not plead that was unsupported by law, 
and fees the court ordered ex parte. 
3. UCA §788-5-826 is intended to equalize litigation risks. 
Noting the dearth of direction in the language of the statute, the courts have 
steered its application toward honoring the underlying policy its enactment was meant 
GI to promote, that policy taking the shape of equally allocating the litigation "risk," 
against the one-sided reality that the enforcement party enjoys "significant bargaining 
advantage." 
The reciprocal attorney fee statute provides no guidance as to 
when fees should be awarded .. . [d]istrict courts should look to 
the policies underlying the statute in exercising this discretion. 
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, f/17, 160 P.3d 1041. (Internal 
citations omitted; emphasis added) 
The statute levels the playing field by allowing both parties to 
recover fees, [r]emedying the unequal allocation of litigation risks 
built into many contracts of adhesion. In addition, this statute 
rectifies the inequitable common law result where a party that 
seeks to enforce a contract containing an attorney fees clause has 
a significant bargaining advantage over a party that seeks to 
invalidate the contract. Id. at '118 (Internal citations omitted; 
emphasis added) 
[u]se of the word "may" also indicates that courts have broad 
discretion in applying equitable principles in fixing the amount of 
any award of fees under the statute. Id. at '121 (Emphasis added) 
1-D held the "significant bargaining advantage" over Gillman, that advantage 
forged from I-D's unwavering insistence that the contract was express, and demanding 
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collection of its full charges. Along the way, 1-D ran up a colossal sum of attorney fees, 
choosing a litigation strategy that utilized liens it would lose, long before trial. 1-D 
refused to settle before trial, unless Gillman relinquished her statutory rights to 
attorney fees for defeating the mechanic's liens. Gillman's sole recourse in the standoff 
was the intercession of the law-intercession that could not be achieved without trial. 
Within the 'Gillman-faulf theory, the court re-litigated those liens, then in its 
"discretion," awarded 1-D attorney fees for losing them, together with all of I-D's trial • 
attorney fees, even though the contract failed its burden of proof.20 
4. UCA §788-5-826 is hypothetical in its application. 
The courts characterize reciprocity as exclusively hypothetical in the nature of its 
operational purpose, to level the playing field and equalize the litigation risks among 
parties to contracts, protecting a single standard, not promoting a double standard: 
The classic application of the statute involves a one-sided fee 
provision in a dispute between the parties to the contract. And in 
that archetypal scenario, the statutory analysis of whether the 
contract allows "at least one party to recover" is undertaken in 
the hypothetical-under an alternative consideration in which the 
tables were turned and the opposite party prevailed. Because only 
that approach preserves the classic case covered by the statute, 
we interpret its language to contemplate the hypothetical analysis. 
Hooban v. Unicity Int'/, Inc., 2009 UT App 287, f/26, 220 P.3d 485, 
aff'd, 2012 UT 40, 285 P.3d 766 (Emphasis added) 
2° Closing arguments were submitted in writing. Gillman thoroughly briefed the court on the 
principles of express contract, quantum meruit, their respective burdens of proof, and I-D's 
failure of its burden. The court was fully advised before ruling and overtly rejected the Davies 
dicta in its decision that the contract was express, rather than implied-in-fact. (R. 602-622, 
Written Closing Argument of Defendant) 
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5. Gillman is due her trial attorney fees under the Reciprocal Fee statute, 
and should be awarded her attorney fees on appeal. 
Had the court not erred in its conclusion of law that there was a binding contract, 
and entered the correct conclusion that the contract was implied-in-fact, I-D would have 
lost the trial outcome for its failure to meet the burden of proof to establish it charges 
were a reasonable market value. Under that hypothetical scenario, the tables would 
have turned and Gillman would have recovered her trial attorney fees. In the exercise 
of its "discretion," the court awarded I-D all of its trial fees with no inquiry past a scant 
Affidavit and billing records. In the hypothetical equation of the statute's intent, 
reciprocity dictates Gillman be treated identically in recovering all of her trial fees. 
Anything less would not preserve the integrity of justice that is the Reciprocal Fee 
<i statute's policy intent. The same standard of the court's discretion for I-D's fee 
calculation should be duplicated for Gillman's fees. 
Gillman should be awarded her attorney fees for this appeal. See Va/carce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) 
Conclusion 
This simple contract case over a disputed invoice for electrical services totaling 
$1,827.61, exploded into an epic conflict over attorney fees that approximate 
$100,000-the result of mechanic's liens I-D lost pre-trial, but has refused to concede. 
Re-litigated at trial, the liens jaundiced the court's rulings with the prejudice of I-D's 
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'Gillman-fault' theory. The court adopted that theory, assessing Gillman the fees of 
litigation, which included I-D's lien losses. 
The court erred in its denial of Gillman's statutory attorney fees for defeating the 
liens; erred in ruling that the Salt Lake condo lien was not wrongful; and, erred in ruling 
that I-D's contract was express, when it had no price. I-D's basis of contract recovery 
was in quantum meruit, which carried a burden of proof for establishing the reasonable 
market value of its charges. 1-D failed that burden of proof. The only evidence in the 
record for the reasonable market value was adduced at trial by 1-D in its direct 
examination of Gillman, and is between $600 and $700. 1-D had its day in court. 
Reasonable market valuation between $600 and $700 is the only evidence it presented 
in quantum meruit. 
This court should: 
1. Reverse the trial court and award Gillman's statutory attorney fees for 
successfully defeating the two mechanic's liens. 
2. Reverse the trial court's ruling that the Salt Lake condo lien was not 
wrongful, and award Gillman both tiers of statutory penalties and attorney 
fees. 
3. Reverse the trial court's conclusion of law that the contract was express, 
rather than implied-in-fact, and direct that: 
a. The contract burden of proof is the reasonable market value of I-D's 
services, which is between $600 and $700-the only evidence in 
the trial record. 
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b. Gillman be awarded all of her trial attorney fees under the 
Reciprocal Fee statute, on the same discretionary basis the trial 
court utilized to award 1-D all of its trial attorney fees. 
4. Award Gillman her attorney fees for this appeal. 
DATED this 15th day of February 2016. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
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I-D ELECTRIC, INC., 
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V. 
LINDA T. GILMAN, 
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-~ 1-o ~~ 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 110917777 
Judge RICHARD D. McKELVIE 
DATE: January 20, 2015 
This matter crune before the Court for trial November 10-13, 2014. The parties thereafter 
submitted written closing arguments. The Court, having reviewed the testimony and exhibits 
entered at trial, and having considered the arguments of coW1sel, enters these findings pursuant to 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Following is a list of the witnesses testifying at trial, together with a synopsis of their 
testimony, and (where appropriate) specific findings regarding the adoption or rejection by the 
Court of their testimony. 
A. Chet Hunter 
1 
· Chet Hunter testified that he is a journeyman electrician who has been employed by 
Plaintiff since 1998. On March 10, 2011, Hunter was at an electrical wholesale supply picking 
up supplies when he was approached by Defendant, whom he had not met previously. 
Defendant asked Hunter if he was an electrician, and when he responded in the affomative, she 
told him she wanted to hire him to do some work on a house, and asked her to follow him to the 
residence. 1 
1 Defendant testified that she did not request that Hunter follow her, and would never have done so. As will be 
explained as appropriate in these findings, the Court credits the testimony of Hunter and discredits the testimony of 
Defendant on this point. Although this point is clearly not critical to the fmdings of the Court, there are numerous 
instances in which Defendant's testimony was directly at odds with other witnesses at trial, which will be identified. 
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2
· Hunter explained that he had another job and could not follow her at that time, but 
provided contact information. Later that day, he met her at the residence, in Herriman, Utah. 
They met for "a couple of hours" and went over the scope of work she requested. No work was 
performed that day, but arrangements were made to begin work the following day. 
3
·Toe primary work requested of defendant was in the garage of the property, and included 
moving wires that were hung over the trusses of the garage so that a floor could be installed in 
the attic of the garage. Other work included replacing power outlets, moving switches, and 
moving a sprinkler control box. Defendant did not ask for a bid, but she did ask Hunter how 
much the work would cost. Defendant had some materials in the garage, which she asked Hunter 
to use on the project in favor of materials supplied by Plaintiff. He indicated he would use her 
materials to the extent possible. 
4
· The following day (Friday, March 11, 2011) Hunter returned to the Herriman property 
with Blake Trip and Brick Anderson. Trip was a journeyman electrician and Anderson was an 
apprentice. They arrived at the job site between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m.2 and accessed the garage by 
using a key code given to Hunter by Defendant. Their first priority was to move the wiring 
across the trusses so the flooring could be placed. 
5
"Defendant arrived at the residence mid-morning and remained through much of the day. 
She observed some of the work in progress, and consulted with Hunter to a degree, but was 
largely engaged in other projects during the day. At some point in the afternoon, Hunter left the 
residence to go to Home Depot in order to purchase special wire needed to complete the 
relocation of the sprinkler box. The OPS log indicates he left at 2:13 p.m. and returned at 2:51 
p.m.• When he returned to the residence Defendant had left and did not return that day. Hunter 
left for the day at 5:17 p.m. 
6
· Hunter prepared a work order which outlined the tasks completed and the amount of time 
spent by each electrician. Hunter went over the work order with Defendant, who indicated that 
she was "OK " with it and wanted them to return to complete more work. She asked for a price 
estimate, but Hunter explained that the pricing would be done by the company management. 
That work order was presented to Defendant for signature by one of the other workers while 
2 Hunter's company truck was equipped with a GPS tracking device which tracked the time and location of the truck 
at any time it was operating. The log was produced to Defendant by Plaintiff as an enclosure to a letter dated April 
7, 2011 providing an invoice for work done. The letter and accompanying log were introduced as Exhibit 5 at trial. 
The paJ!ies stipulated that the log was off by one hour, and that a notation (as an example) of Hunter's arrival at The 
Herriman property at 9:19:20 on March 11 was actually 8:19 a.m. The GPS log is critical to the Court's analysis of 
the credibility of witnesses that follows. 
3 The Home Depot receipt, part of Exhibit 2, indicates a time of2:41 p.m., which is consistent with the GPS log. 
2 
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"Hunter was gone to Home Depot, and Defendant signed the work order, which was admitted as 
Exhibit 2. Adjacent to Defendant's signature is the following notation: 
(i) Payable 30 days net - A service charge of 2% per month which is an annual rate of 24% 
will be charged on all past due accounts. Purchaser agrees to pay all costs and expenses 
including reasonable attorney's fees in the event collection becomes necessary. There 
will be handling and restocking charges on all returned goods. 
The following Monday, Hunter attempted to contact Defendant to arrange to return to the 
home to begin completion of the work. He left messages, which she did not return. He went to 
@ the Herriman home and attempted to gain entry, but the garage code had been changed. 
B. Blake Trip 
8
• Blake Trip testified that he was a residential journeyman electrician wor~g for Plaintiff 
in March, 2011. He accompanied Hunter to the Herriman job site on March 11, and participated 
in the work done. He testified generally that he and his co-workers were busily engaged 
throughout the day, and completed a large amount of work. He also testified that at some point 
during the afternoon, Hunter had to go to Home Depot to purchase sprinkler wire. While Hunter 
was gone, Defendant indicated she was leaving for the day. Prior to her departure, Trip 
requested and obtained her signature at the bottom of the work order (Exhibit 2). He also 
testified that at no time did she complain about the quality of the work done. 
C. Trip Anderson 
9
· Trip Anderson testified that he accompanied Hunter and Trip to the Herriman job site. 
He was an apprentice electrician, and testified that he "got stuck with" the jobs no-one else 
wanted to do. Because of his slight build, he often was the only one on a job site who could 
access small areas such as crawl-spaces and attics. He testified that he spent the entire day in the 
attic replacing the wiring so the flooring could be placed. He indicated there was a great deal of 
physical labor necessary because there was an abundance of building supplies that needed to be 
moved. Much of the attic had no floor, and he had to balance himself, while lying down, on the 
narrow edge of roof joists and trusses. He testified that he saw Defendant "a few times" when 
she came up into the attic to determine his progress, but that she was mostly in the garage. 
D. Kim Olson 
10
·Kim 01 son testified that he is the president of Plaintiff, ID-Electric. He has worked for 
the company for 45 years. He testified that in 2011, the company rate for journeyman and 
apprentice electricians, respectively, was $65 and $50 per hour, which he acknowledged was "a 
little above median" for the Salt Lake market. He testified that the company considered their 
3 
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ability to get to jobs quickly and on short notice made up for the slight premiwn over the median 
market. 
11 
· Olson testified that there are two common billing arrangements; "cost plus" billing and 
"bid" billing. In cost plus billing, the labor and materials are calculated either at the end of a job 
or, in a longer, more complex project, on an ongoing basis. In bid billing, the company creates 
and submits a binding bid in advance of the work done. Olson testified that most customers 
prefer cost plus billing, and that is the company's default billing system. 
1 2
· Olson became aware of a billing dispute with Defendant when Hunter contacted him and 
asked him to go over the bill with Defendant. Hunter told Olson that Defendant "was a little off'' 
and that he had called to offer to go over the bill, and she had changed to code to the garage. 
Olson contacted Defendant by phone, and she wanted to know how much the remainder of the 
job would cost, which he inferred as a request for a bid. However, no arrangement to complete 
the work was ever made. 
13
·An invoice was sent to Defendant, and ai-9:er 30 days, the company started to call 
Defendant to obtain payment. They left numerous messages, which were never returned.• Olson 
sent a detailed invoice on April 7 ( exhibit 5) outlining the work and hours of each electrician. 
On May 6, 2011, Defendant sent a letter to Olson ( exhibit 6), which stated in part: 
14. 
"Without an exhaustive review of the remaining tasks on the list, please be advised that it 
is my considered judgment that the 2.5 hours charged for what was accomplished is 
commensurately unreasonable and warrants careful reconsideration. As you undertake 
that reconsideration, you might want to factor into your deliberation other salient 
information: I work in both construction and the practice of law. I am very familiar with 
job sites and courtrooms. I just completed the first $4.74 million phase of a 15-month 
construction project in December. The second $1.5 million phase is now underway and 
will be finished this summer. lhis recent construction project resulted :from a multi-
million construction defect lawsuit, out of state. The last five adversaries who lined up 
on the other side of a courtroom from me are out a total of more than $11 million." 
Olson understandably felt that Defendant was trying to intimidate him with the letter, and 
he contacted counsel. He gave his attorney directions to file a mechanic's lien on the property, 
which he has done only two times in the past 5 years. 
4 A_pattem ~erged regarding Defendant•s unwillingness to directly confront the billing issue; in addition to 
habitually falling to return phone calls, she ignored several letters and written communications, including certified 
letters indicating legal proceedings would be or had been initiated. This willful neglect on the part of Defendant 
contributed greatly to the costs incurred by Plaintiff in collecting the debt 
4 
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·Toe company's counsel prepared a mechanic's lien for filing, and presented it to Olson 
for review. Olson did not notice that the lien listed a Salt Lake City Condominium as the subject 
property, rather than the Herriman house.' Olson testified that he did not intend to place a lien on 
the condo, and that it would not be ethical to do so. The Court credits this testimony, and rejects 
defendant's claim that the lien was placed on the condo because the condo was unencumbered by 
any liens or mortgages, but the Herriman property was. As Olson pointed out in his testimony, 
the mechanic's lien was for only $1827, and was placed on the property in an effort to force 
Defendant to respond to repeated efforts to collect the debt. There is no evidence in the record to 
support Defendant's contention that the condo was deliberately chosen as a target for the lien. 
From all of the evidence, and the logical inferences to be drawn therefrom, the Court concludes 
and finds that the· placement of the lien on the condo rather than the Herriman house was a 
clerical error made by Plaintiff's counsel and not a deliberate act to gain tactical advantage in the 
collection of the debt. 
16
·on November 11, 2011, Defendant delivered a letter to Olsen's office. At that time, 
Defendant knew that Plaintiff was represented by counsel (this issue will be discussed in further 
detail below) and she had also retained counsel, although the record is not clear that Olson knew 
that at the time. This letter was introduced as Exhibit 12. Unlike Exhibit 6, which spans two 
pages and is very detailed, Exhibit 12 is deliberately vague, and states in its entirely (excluding 
salutations); 
''Hasn't this already gone too far? First you file a lien on my property and I understand 
that has recently been followed by a Iis pendens. Neither is either reasonable or justified 
under the circumstances, and without a legal basis. Please remove both immediately. 
There is no point in the senseless the [sic] accumulation of any more legal fees. It's 
about time to do the right thing." 
17 
· The Court finds that Defendant knew that the lien bad been placed on the wrong property, 
and that she intentionally and deliberately failed to mention that fact in the letter to Olson. The 
Court further finds that Defendant did so, after consulting with counsel; in a deliberate effort to 
establish a cause of action against Plaintiff for filing a wrongful lien. This finding will be further 
explored below during a discussion of Defendant's testimony. 
18
· On December 6, 2011, Olson received an email from his attorney indicating the lien had 
been filed on the wrong property. Olson instructed counsel to remove the lien immediately. He 
testified, and the Court finds, that this was the first date on which Olson knew the lien had been 
placed on a property other than the one on which the work had been completed. The Plaintiff 
5 Defendant lived at the Salt Lake City Condo, and used the address in all of her correspondence and dealings with 
Plaintiff. She did not reside at the Herriman home, and shared ownership of that home with her daughter. 
5 
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filed a motion with the court to remove the lien that same day. ·•• 
E. Linda Gillman6 
19
·Defendant testified that she owns two properties in Salt Lake County; the home in 
Herriman which is the subject of this lawsuit, and the Salt Lake condo on which the lien was 
erroneously placed. She purchased the Herriman house in 2007 and remodeled it to 
accommodate her aging mother. She was planning to update the home, particularly in the garage 
area, and her primary objective was to move wiring from the trusses in the attic so that flooring 
could be placed there. 
20
·nefendant testified that she is a graduate of the University of Utah College of Law (in the 
70s). She testified that she has never been a member of any bar. She made the following 
statements regarding her relationship with the practice of law, in the course of her testimony: 
"I'm an attorney of sorts." 
"I'm not a member of the bar." 
"I've been practicing law for about 10 years." 
"I have been working with clients but I have to be associated" with a licensed attorney. 
"I do the work and they sign it." 
"I have drafted most of the pleadings" in the instant case. 
"I didn't draft the initial pleading but I've drafted most of the rest." 
21 
·Defendant testified that she met Chet Hunter at the electrical wholesale supply, and 
approached him about doing electrical work on the Herriman house. He came to the home later 
in the day, and they walked through the house, looking at the projects she wanted completed. 
She testified, however, that "he stood around in my kitchen for a long, long time talking about 
politics." She testified that she asked for a bid, and that he told her "he would give me a number 
in the morning." 
22
·nefendant testified that she arrived at the Herriman home the following morning. All 
three of the electricians were there when she got there, but they were not working. The Court 
discredits this testimony and finds, pursuant to the testimony of Plaintiff's witnesses, that all 3 
electricians were substantially engaged in pursuit of their work during their time at Defendant's 
property. Their testimony was consistent with one another, and the Court finds there testimony 
truthful on that point. Moreover, as will be pointed out in detail, Defendant's testimony that the 
electricians were not substantially working is contradicted not only by their collective testimony 
but by objective facts and logical inferences the Court draws from those facts. 
6 Defendant Gillman testified on two separate occasions. She was initially called by Plaintiff, and then testified on 
her own behalf. For the sake of continuity, the Court addresses both instances together. 
6 
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·Defendant testified that although it seemed Hunter was working, "Blake (Trip) was 
leaning on a counter" and "Brick (Anderson) was lying on a truss in the attic," but not working. 
Defendant testified that she didn't comment or complain, because she thought she would only be 
charged "for the time they were actually working." "It never crossed my mind that I was paying 
these guys $100 an hour to do nothing." The Court finds this statement not credible. Anyone 
with Defendant's professed knowledge of construction and the construction industry would 
surely realize that workers on a job site, being compensated on an hourly basis, would be paid 
for the entirety of their time, and would not keep track of minutes or moments during which they 
were not actively engaged. 
24
· Defendant testified that when she arrived at the house at 10:00, the rewiring in the attic 
had already been completed. This testimony is squarely contradicted by testimony that the attic 
project took all day. Further, Defendant testified that Anderson was in the attic the entire time 
she was there, and that she only saw him when she went into the attic. To accept her testimony 
then, would be to accept that from 10:00 a.m. to at least 3:30 p.m., when Defendant testified she 
left, Anderson lay on his back in an unheated, unlit attic, on narrow trusses, doing absolutely 
nothing. This testimony is at odds with the weight of the testimony in the case, and contrary to 
any notion of common sense, and the Court rejects it. 
25
" Defendant testified that she left around 3:30, and signed Exhibit 2 (the work order) before 
she left. Hunter was not there at the time, and the work order was presented by Trip. She 
testified that she did not read the paragraph (regarding payment terms) at the bottom of the form. 
She acknowledged, however, that it is common language on construction fonns, with which she 
is very familiar. 
26
· Regarding Defendant's testimony about the work done on March 11, there is a wealth of 
evidence that contradicts her. As an example, she testified that she observed while Hunter and 
Trip "fished" the wire and did the other work necessary to move the sprinkler box, and that work 
was completed before Hunter left. However, the objective evidence is clear that Hunter left in 
mid-afternoon to obtain that very wire, and that Defendant was gone by the time he returned. 
Defendant testified that Hunter left more than once; first to get the wire, and then again before 
she left at 3:30. That testimony is contradicted both by fact and logic. The OPS logs make clear 
that after returning from Home Depot, Hunter did not leave again until 5: 17, long after 
Defendant was gone. Further, he returned with the wire at 2:51. It is unreasonable to infer that 
there was time for Hunter and Trip to complete the sprinkler box removal, and for Hunter to 
leave again, before Defendant left at 3:30. Defendant's testimony regarding the events of that 
day are largely contradicted by objectively believable evidence. 
7 
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· Defendant testified that the following Monday, March 14, Kim Olson called_her, and told 
her the bill for the work to date was $1827. She expressed to him that she was "stunned" by the 
amount, and remembered saying, "for one day?" She testified that "after Mr. Olson called me, it 
was pretty clear what had happened. I didn't want these people working for me any longer." 
She said that she never talked to Hunter again, and that she left town "a day or two after." She 
testified that she got a "couple" of voicemails from Hunter because he wanted to get back into 
the house to finish the work," but she never called him back. In another contradiction, 
Defendant testified that she had changed the code on the garage door over the weekend. At an 
earlier time, she testified that she changed the code after she had talked to Olson and found out 
how much they intended to charge her. 
28
· Defendant testified that she asked for a breakdown of charges after she received the 
invoice from Plaintiff. She also testified that she knew the company was trying to reach her, but 
she was neither taking nor returning their calls. She also testified she never received a certified 
letter sent by Plaintiff's counsel, urging her to pay the invoice, and suggesting legal action would 
be taken if she did not ( exhibit 7) Nor did she receive Exhibit 8, another letter from counsel 
dated June 15, notifying her that a mechanic's lien had been placed on her property. 
29
• Defendant testified she didn't receive the letters because she was out of town for much of 
the time between March and mid-June, 2011. Notably, Defendant provided absolutely no 
evidence indicating the dates she was gone, where she was, or the dates she was back in town. 
The inference from her testimony is that she never received the notices for the certified mail, 
which she did not therefore pick up from the post office. Again, the Court rejects her testimony. 
By all observations, including her own testimony, Defendant is a capable, accomplished 
business-woman who keeps meticulous records and appears to retain everything. Any 
documentation of business travel would have been required for business and tax purposes, and 
could have easily been provided to the Court in support of her contention that she was gone for 
the entirety of this critical period. The fact that she provided no such testimony or 
documentation, coupled with her admissions that she continually avoided returning phone calls 
and correspondence from Plaintiff, leads the Court to conclude that her avoidance of these letters 
was willful rather than circumstantial. 
30
· Defendant spoke with counsel for Plaintiff on June 16, and he told her a lien had been 
filed on her property. She went to the County Recorder's office to confirm the lien, but could 
not. She did not look to determine whether a lien had been filed on the condo, but checked only 
the Herriman house. Defendant testified that she was served with the pending lawsuit on 
September 25, 2011, and that it was the first time she realized that the lien had been placed on 
the wrong property. 
8 
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· Defendant testified that she obtained counsel in mid-October, because she wasn't very 
well-versed in Utah law and wanted to find someone who was. Regarding Exhibit 12, the letter 
demanding the lien be removed, she testified that she delivered the letter to Plaintiff personally 
"on the advice of counsel.'" She testified that she knew that the failure to remove the lien within 
10 days would result in a potential damage claim in her favor against Plaintiff. 
32
·Again, the Court rejects Defendant's testimony on this score. Defendant is admittedly 
trained in the law, and is engaged in the practice of law, albeit without a license. Her suggestion 
that she and her counsel determined that in order to be effective the letter would have to be 
delivered directly by her to Plaintiff is not only an invalid legal conclusion, it is an improper one. 
She and her counsel both knew that Plaintiff was represented by counsel, and presumably her 
counsel knew, even if she did not, that direct communication with a represented party in a 
violation of the Canons of Ethics. The Court finds that Defendant's decision to deliver the letter 
personally, whether on advice of counsel or not, was a deliberate attempt to obscure the reason 
she believed the lien was improper, and thereby set up a claim of wrongful lien. The Court finds 
that Defendant knew or reasonably should have known that any such letter authored or signed by 
her counsel and directed to Plaintiffs counsel, would by ethical standards be required to contain 
more particularity regarding the factual or legal inadequacies of the mechanic's lien. 1bis 
finding is further supported by the testimony of Defendant, who acknowledged that she and her 
counsel emailed several drafts of the letter back and forth before agreeing on the final version. 
Given the paucity of the letter, it becomes even more clear that it was intentionally vague in an 
attempt to lay a trap for improper or wrongful lien. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT DAMAGES AS 
SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF 
33. 
Plaintiff claims, and the Court finds, that there was a binding contract between Plaintiff 
and Defendant. The necessary elements are present. Gillman's request for Plaintiffs 
services, given to Hunter at the electrical supply warehouse, constitutes an offer to contract. 
Plaintiff's acceptance is evidenced by Hunter's act of going to the Herriman home and 
completing the scope of work, and arranging for a crew of electricians to begin work the 
following day. Thus, offer and acceptance are present. 
34. 
There is clearly a meeting of the minds. Plaintiff expected to be paid for the work and 
7 It is important to note that the counsel identified by Defendant as having shared this advice was NOT counsel who 
represented Defendant at trial. 
9 
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materials provided, and Defendant clearly expected to pay. Although the exact costs and 
work were not confirmed at the outset, Defendant was well-versed in construction contracts, 
and knew to expect that she would be billed for both supplies and labor. The fact that she 
expressed dissatisfaction about the amount billed does not diminish the fact that she 
undertook a responsibility to pay. Moreover, she signed the work order, which had been 
substantially completed ( albeit without prices) at the time. By doing so she acknowledged 
not only an obligation to pay, but an undertaking to pay a service charge and collection costs, 
to include attorney's fees, in order to enforce the contract. 
35
· Plaintiff substantially performed the terms of the contract. Although disputed by 
Defendant, the Court has found that the electricians provided by Plaintiff were continuously 
and properly engaged in the work for which they were employed. In her testimony 
Defendant went to great lengths to point out that many of the tasks performed by them were 
menial in nature, and she demonstrated that she could have done many of them herself. That 
misses the point. Defendant engaged the services of trained electricians, and had to lmow 
that they would be compensated the same amount ( as Olson testified) for changing a light 
bulb as for replacing a circuit box or performing some other sophisticated procedure. 
Further, as outlined above, Defendant has dramatically understated the amount of work 
performed by Plaintiff, and the time it took. The Court has rejected her testimony on that 
score. The Court concludes that the work order accurately reflects the goods and services 
provided to Defendant pursuant to the contract. 
36
· Further, the contract carries a provision for service charges, collection costs and 
attorney's fees. 1bis provision was aclmowledged by defendant both at the time of receipt 
and at trial. There is no ambiguity in the contract, and no dispute that defendant was aware 
of the provision when she signed it. 
37 
· Plaintiff has argued to the Court that, in the event there is no valid contract, principles of 
unjust enrichment provide the basis for judgment. In light of the Court's ruling on the 
validity of the contract, the Court will not address the issue of unjust enrichment. 
2. PLAINTIFF IS NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM A WRONGFUL 
LIEN 
38
·Defendant's reliance on Hutterv. Dig-it 2009 UT 69,219 P.3d 918, is misplaced. The 
Hutter case does stand for the proposition, as propounded by Defendant, that a mechanic's lien is 
unenforceable under circumstances similar to those presented here. However, that issue is not 
before the Court. Plaintiff in this case is not making any effort to enforce the lien, and removed 
the lien as soon as it was learned that it had been placed on the wrong property. Rather, 
10 
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• 
• 
Defendant seeks to utilize the Wrongful Lien statute (38-9-2(3) as a bludgeon rather than a 
shield. 
39
·As pointed out by Plaintiff, the lien here is not "wrongful" under the wrongful lien act. A 
lien is not ''wrongful" because it is inaccurate or misidentifies the property it seeks to encumber. 
The lien is "authorized by statute" which takes it out of the definition of a wrongful lien. As the 
Hutter Court explained, a lien that is ultimately proved unenforceable is not a wrongful lien by 
virtue of that fact alone. 
4o.Further, the evidence supports that there was a good-faith basis for filing the lien, and the 
Court finds that the lien was misplaced due to an explainable error. Although the work was done 
on the Herriman property, Defendant used her condo address as a billing address and in all of her 
correspondence with Plaintiff. Although it evidences a lack of thoroughness, the use of the 
billing address in the lien is an understandable error. There is no evidence in the record to 
suggest that the lien was misplaced in an effort to cause damage to Defendant or to gain a legal 
or tactical advantage. 
41 
·Conversely, the record is abundantly clear that, realizing Plaintiff's error in filing the lien, 
Defendant made a determined effort to capitalize on that error to her advantage. Clearly, 
Defendant suffered no harm from the misplaced lien, and her "lying in wait" strategy had at least 
one positive effect, from her standpoint. It made the lien unenforceable, and the delay created a 
legal impediment to Plaintiff's filing of a subsequent lien on the correct property. The Court 
sees no impropriety in such a defensive tactic, but will not recognize it as an appropriate cause of 
action to obtain damages against Plaintiff. 
3. ATTORNEY'S FEES . 
a. Plaintiff's fees 
42
• The Court has determined that Plaintiff prevails in its breach of contract claim. The contract 
itself has a provision for attorney's fees. In its written argument, Plaintiff has not claimed an 
amount for attorney's fees, but has not waived the right to do so. The Court finds that Plaintiff 
may be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in this matter, and directs Plaintiff to submit a 
proposed order regarding attorney's fees. 
b. Defendant's fees 
43
· The Court has found against Defendant on the breach of contract claim, and has similarly 
ruled against Defendant on her wrongful lien claim. The Court has recognized no cause of 
11 
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action for which Defendant may be entitled to fees. 
44
· Moreover, it is clear, and the Court finds, that the expenses in this case, born by both parties, 
have been exacerbated by Defendant's continued and unreasonable efforts to avoid paying a 
contractual obligation, and by attempting to use Plaintiff's harmless ( and arguably beneficial, to 
Defendant) error to create a wrongful lien cause of action. It is therefore appropriate that 
Defendant bear the costs of Plaintiff's fees as well as her own. 
ORDER 
45
·rt is the order of the Court that Defendant is directed to pay to Plaintiff the following 
amounts: 
46
· t. $3,393.09, representing damages due to breach of contract, including service fees 
(interest) through November 20, 2014. 
4 7 
· 2. An amount of interest, pre-and-post judgment, to be determined by the Court based on 
submission by Plaintiff and rebuttal by Defendant. 
48
· 3. Attorney's feels in an amount to be determined by the Court based on submission by 
Plaintiff and rebuttal by Defendant. 
49
· It is the further order of the Court that Defendant's claim based on wrongful lien be, and the 
same is hereby, dismissed. 
SO ORDERED thistfliay of January, 2015. 
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(ii) 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
_ .... 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following 
people for case 110917777 by the method and on the date specified. 
MAIL: BRADY T GIBBS 
MAIL: MARK D STUBBS 
01/29/2015 
Date: 
11650 S STATE ST STE 103 DRAPER, UT 84020 
3301 N UNIVERSITY AVE PROVO UT 84604 
/s/ MCKAE MARRIOT 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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Tab 2 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUNO 8 2015 
sy __ s_AL-'iet, __ c_.l~N~T/..._--
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 'fmRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
1-D ELECTRIC, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LINDA T. GILMAN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
ATIORNEY'S FEES 
Case No. 110917777 
Judge RICHARD D. McKELVIE 
DATE: June 8, 2015 
11 
• This matter is before the Court on Plaintif:f s Motion for Attorney's Fees, Costs and 
Interest. The matter was heard by bench trial and the Court entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff 
on January 29, 2015. The Court thereafter denied Defendant's Motion to Amend Ruling on 
March 18, 2015. Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant motion and accompanying memorandum, 
and Defendant filed an appropriate response with exhibits. The Court, having reviewed the 
pleadings and the record in this case, enters the following order. 
2
• The Court previously held that Defendant was responsible for damages based upon 
Defendant's breach of contract. The Court also ruled that Defendant's claim for wrongful lien 
was improper, and that claim was dismissed. 
3• The Court reserved on the issue of attorney's fees, but expressly stated: 
"Moreover, it is clear, and the Court finds, that the expenses in this case, born by both 
parties, have been exacerbated by Defendant's continued and unreasonable efforts to avoid 
paying a contractual obligation, and by attempting to use Plaintiff's harmless (and arguably 
beneficial, to Defendant) error to create a wrongful lien cause· of action. It is therefore 
appropriate that Defendant bear the costs of Plaintiff's fees as well as her own.'' (Order, January 
20, 2015). 
4
"Plaintiff seeks fees in the amount of $29,144, and costs in the amount of $465.32. Defendant 
argues that "approximately half of total attorney fees on both sides of this case was spent 
asserting/defending the unlawful lien claims that Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed or summarily 
R. 815 
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• 
• 
lost." Although Defendant correctly asserts that many of the fees involved the litigation over a 
mechanic's lien, she is incorrect in her assertion that those generated fees are the result of 
Plaintiff's own actions. The Court's earlier ruling is in contravention of that argument. 
5
·First, it must be noted that the Court determined that the lien was not "unlawful." Although 
the lien was filed against the wrong property, the Court determined that the errant filing was 
inadvertent and was corrected immediately upon Plaintiffs counsel learning of the error. 
Notwithstanding that correction, Defendant insisted on pursuing a cause of action for wrongful 
lien, both through motion for summary judgment and at trial. The mechanic's lien issue became 
the ''tail wagging the dog" in this case, and Defendant was relentless in her pursuit of it. Indeed, 
although Defendant argues that she made repeated attempts at settlement in this matter, Plaintiff 
alleges by Affidavit of counsel that none of her settlement offers included a settlement of her 
"wrongful lien" cause of action. 
«».Defendant correctly asserts: "Why attorney fees escalated to more than 32 times Plaintiff's 
underlying con~ct claim cannot be ignored." Yet, Defendant then does her best to ignore the 
cause, casting blame on Plaintiff for filing a mechanics lien after its repeated attempts to collect a 
valid debt went not just unanswered, but literally ignored. 
7 
·The Court does not excuse Plaintiff's error, and finds that $3,632 of its claimed fees were 
generated as a result of "active litigation of the Mechanic's Lien." Plaintiff's reply brief, p. 4. 
Accordingly, the Court is of the view that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover those fees, and the 
award of attorney's fees will be reduced by that amount. 
8
• However, the Court has previously determined that the driving force behind this litigation 
was Defendant's intractable position that the original charges for services were unreasonable, 
and her steadfast determination to take advantage of an inadvertent clerical error committed by 
Plaintiff's counsel. It is extremely doubtful that this matter would have extended to a three-day 
trial (or gone to trial at all) over the initial claim based on work performed and not paid for. 
Defendant made a strategic decision to take advantage of the misplaced lien, not only as a means 
of avoiding the original debt, but as a means of punishing Plaintiff for taking action against her. 
Her own words, cited to in the Court's verdict in this matter, underscore this fact: 
"Without an exhaustive review of the remaining tasks on the list, please be advised that it 
is my considered judgment that the 2.5 hours charged for what was accomplished is 
commensurately unreasonable and warrants careful reconsideration. As you undertake 
that reconsideration, you might want to factor into your deliberation other salient 
information: I work in both construction and the practice of law. I am very familiar with 
job sites and courtrooms. I just completed the first $4.74 million phase of a 15-month 
2 
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construction project in December. The second $1.5 million phase is now underway and 
will be finished this summer. This recent construction project resulted from a multi-
million construction defect lawsuit, out of state. The last five adversaries who lined up 
on the other side of a courtroom from me are out a total of more than $11 million." 
Letter from Defendant to Plaintiff, dated May 6, 2011. 
90 To Plaintiff, this action was nothing more than an effort to collect a valid debt. To 
Defendant, it appeared to be an affront to her professional abilities and her sense of propriety. 
The Court views defendant as primarily, if not solely, responsible for the excessive and 
unnecessary costs associated with this case, and hereby ORDERS as follows: 
Defendant is to pay Plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of $25,512 (sought fees of 
$29,144 less $3632 discussed above. 
Defendant is to pay Plaintiff's costs in the amount of 465 .32. 
Defendant is to pay Plaintiff 24% per annum interest on the above amounts calculated 
from the <;late of judgment and adjusted for any amounts already taken into consideration 
by the calculations of Plaintiff's counsel in it' prayer for an award amount. 
SO ORDERED this f' day of June, 2015. 
3 
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Tab 3 
Brady T. Gibbs #11049 
WRONA GORDON & DUBOIS, P.C. 
11650 S. State St., Suite I 03 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Ph: 801.676.5252 
Fax: 801.676.5262 
Email: gibbs@wgdlawfinn.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
I-D ELECTRIC, INC. a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LINDA T. GILLMAN, 
Defendant. 
APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT 
OF JUDGMENT 
Case Number: 110917777 
Judge Richard McKelvie 
Plaintiff I-D Electric, Inc. ("Plaintiff') by and through its counsel of record, and pursuant 
to the Judgment entered by this Com1 on July 9, 2015 (the "Judgment"), a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A," and hereby requests that the Court augment the Judgment in the 
amount ofreasonable attorney's fees expended in obtaining this Judgment from February 4, 2015 
through July 14, 2015. 
As grounds for this Application, the current Judgment amount includes only those costs 
and attorneys fees incurred through February 4, 2015, together with interest from the date of the 
Court's January 29, 2015 Order. Since February 4, 2015, additional attorney fees have been 
necessarily incurred in pursuing this action to Judgment. These fees are compensable pursuant to 
the terms of the underlying contract and paragraph 5 of the Judgment. 
This Application is supported by the Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Cost in Support of 
this Application, filed concurrently herewith. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter the accompanying First 
Amended Judgment, augmenting the original Judgment in the amount of $5,481.27 for a total 
augmented Judgment amount of$36,939.29. 
Dated this 15th day ofJuly, 2015. 
WRONA GORDON & DUBOIS, P.C. 
ls/Brady T. Gibbs 
Brady T. Gibbs 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 

Tab 4 
• 
Brady T. Gibbs #11049 
WRONA GoRDON & DuBOIS, P.C. 
11650 South State Street, Suite 103 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Telephone: (801) 676-5252 
Facsimile: (801) 676-5262 
Email: gibbs@wgdlawfirm.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
(450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84114) 
I-D ELECTRIC, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
Case Number: 110917777 
vs. 
LINDA T. GILLMAN, 
Judge Richard McKelvie 
Defendant. 
The Court having previously entered Judgment against Defendant, Linda T. Gillman on 
July 9, 2015 (the "Original Judgment"), which provides that "This Judgment may be augmented 
upon proper application by Plaintiff for costs and attorney fees incurred in collecting the total 
judgment amount," and Plaintiff having accrued an additional $5,481.27 in costs and attorneys' 
fees between February 4, 2015 and July 14, 2015 which have not otherwise been included in the 
Original Judgment, and which costs and fees are compensable pursuant to the underlying 
July 17, 2015 09:44 AM 1 of 3 
contract at issue in this action, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that: 
1. The Original Judgment is augmented in the amount of$5,481.27 for a total 
Judgment amount of$36,939.29. 
END OF ORDER 
Entered by the Court on the date indicated by the Court's Seal at the top of the first page 
July 17, 2015 09:44 AM 2 of 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of July, 2015, pursuant to Rule 5(b)(l)(a)(i), I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing First Amended Judgment to be delivered via 
Utah State Bar electronic filing system and/or via the method of delivery checked below to the 
following: 
Mark D. Stubbs 
FILMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
July 17, 2015 09:44 AM 
First Class U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Facsimile Transmission 
Personal Delivery 
Email Transmission Attachment 
Isl Gwen Mortensen 
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1-D Electric, Inc. 
Electrical Conl ractors 3690 South 500 West. Suite 101 
Salt lako City, Utah 84115 
Phone (801) 268-1471 
INVOICE NO. 
INVOICE 84 49 
BILL 
TO 
Linda Gil lman JOB GILLIN 4708 Canary Bird Cove 
753 Shady Creek Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106-154 7 
CUSTOMER PURCHASE ORDER NO. BILL THRU 
GILLIN S11316 
ITEM NO. QUANTITY DESCRIPTION 
S11316 
Supply and install material and labor for the 
following: 
Relocate wiring in attic area 
Add light and switch in closet 
Relocate sprinkler control box 
Add outlet for sprinkler control box 
Add switch for attic lights 
Change devices to brown 
Insta ll light above garage sink 
3/10/11 
2 Labor: Chet 
3/1 1/11 
1 3 gang nail up 
1 2 gang cut in 
4 S ing le pole togg le 
1 P-1 
1 P-3 
175 12-2 romex 
1 4/3 round cut in 
1 , 4/3 barhanger 
2 4 square special 
2 4 square blank 
1 RCR50 
7 1 gang deep nail up 
50 8" 1 hole zipties 
40 Staples 
PLEASE RETURN YELLOW COPY WITH YOUR PAYMENT. 
TERMS - Payment is due wit11in 30 days from invoice date. 2% per month (24% annual) interest charged on 
overdue accounts. If court action becomes necessary, customer agrees to pay all costs and attorney iees. 
TERMS INVOICE DATE PAGE 
Net 30 3/24/11 1 
UNIT PRICE EXTENDED PRICE 
65.00 130.00* 
3.20 3.20* 
1.77 1.77* 
1.75 7.00* 
0.50 0.50* 
2.00 2.00* 
0.55 96.25* 
3.56 3.56* 
3.65 3.65* 
2.40 4.80* 
1.77 3.54* 
0.80 0.80* 
1.23 8.61 * 
1.00 50.00* 
0.10 4.00* 
SALE AMOUNT 
CUSTOMER COPY 
• 
• 
• 
1-D Electric, Inc. 
Electrical Contraciors 3690 South 500 West, Suite 10 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 115 
Phone (801) 268-1 471 
INVOICE NO. 
INVOICE 84849 
BILL Linda Gil lman JOB GILLIN 4708 Canary Bird Cove 
TO 753 Shady Creek Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106-1547 
CUSTOMER PURCHASE ORDER NO. BILL THRU 
GILLIN S11316 
ITEM NO. QUANTITY DESCRIPTION 
55 Wirenuts 
6 P-14 blanks 
200 14/2 romex 
1 Wire 
1 Wire twist 
8.5 Labor: Chet 
8.5 Labor: Bric 
8.5 Labor: Blake 
* means item is non-taxable 
PLEASE RETURN YELLOW COPY WITH YOUR PAYMENT. 
TERMS - Payment is due within 30 days from invoice date. 2% per month (24% annual) interest charged on 
overdue accounts. If court action becomes necessary, customer agrees to pay all costs and attorney fees . 
TERMS INVOICE DATE PAGE 
Net 30 3/24/11 2 
UNiT PRICE EXTENDED PRICE 
0.15 8.25* 
0.75 4.50* 
0.32 64.00* 
27.68 27.68* 
1.00 1.00* 
65.00 552.50* 
50.00 425.00* 
50.00 425.00* 
SALE AMOUNT 1,827.61 
$1,827.61 
CUSTOMER COPY 
• 
1NVOICE ~~ i 84849 . 
BILL Linda Gillman 
TO 753 Shady Creek Place 
JOB GILLIN 4708 Canary Bird Cove 
Sel\ lake City, UT 84106-1547 
CUSTOMER PURCHASE ORDER NO. 1. SILL TliAU Tr.RMS I IMI/OICE DA,E I PAGc I 
GILLIN S1 ·1316 I Net 30 I 3124/1 1 I 2 I 
ITEM NO. QUANTITY DESCRIP'rlON UNIT PRICE EXTENDED PRICE 
55 V\/irenu ts 0.15 a.2s· 
6 P-14 blanks 0.75 4.50' 
' 200 14/2 roniex 0,32 64.00' i : : 
1 Wire 
1 Wire twist 
8.5 Labor: Chet 
8.5 Laber: Bric 
8.5 Labor: Blake 
27 .68 27.68' ; I 
1.00 1.00 q __ 
65.00 ss2.so~ I 
50.00 425.00;. I i 
50.00 425.oo· I I 
l 
I 
,.._/A. _-:; c:.-- • I <ycc::5-:S/_,c:__,, 
hr1 C/ .5-✓-- 0 :/ " ~-- : ,- /4-:a:: 
i 
I! Ii 
' I 
l 
I 
------ --- ---~---- --- - ------.---- --,--- - ----l ' 
• means item is non-taxable SALE AMo u:~r 
PLEASE RETURN YELLOW COPY \flfiTH YOUR PAYMENT. 
"TERMS - Paymen! is due wilhin 30 d~ys from in·,oice dato. 2% per month (24¼ ann ual) i~leresl charge:i on 
overdue uccou!11s. II c ourt a: '.ion beco:nes ne:ess.,ry, custome: agrces to pay a I D land attorney iees. 
1,827.61 
$1 ,827 .61 
REMITTAMCE CO! 5 
Tab 7 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
~-D E!ectric 1 !nc. 
Electrical Contractors 
Ap1il 7, 2011 
Linda Gillman 
753 Shady Creek Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106-1547 
RE: 4708 Canary Bird Cove 
Dear Linda, 
Enclosed are the Professional Credentials of each of our electricians. A copy of each license, the 
years they have been with I-D Electric and the homs worked within that period of time. Also 
enclosed you will find the GPS reports from our company truck. Chet's first appointment on 
March 10th is a single sheet showing times and mileage. The second time out with Bric and 
Blalce shows the same information for the date of March 11 th • The hours written in red are the 
correct times. The GPS system did not change over to daylight savings time therefore it shows 
exactly and hours difference in time. 
Below you will find a breakout per your request for each electrical task billed for: 
Relocate wiring in attic area Bric 8 hours 
Blake 3 homs 
Chet ,., hours .) 
Add light and switch in closet Blake 1.5 hours 
Relocate sprinkler control box Chet 2.5 hours 
Add outlet for sprinkler control box Chet 1.5 hours 
Add switch for attic lights Chet 1 hour 
Change devices to brown Blake 2 hours 
Install light above garage sink Blake 1.5 hours 
Drive time Chet .5 homs 
Blake .5 hours 
Bric .5 homs 
3690 South 500 West # 101 Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 (80 1) 268-1471 FAX (801) 268-2112 
• 
This breakout shows each job with the electrician that worked on the job and the hours spent on 
each job. The time spent on the electrical comes to exactly 25.5 hours. Blake is also a 
Residential Journeyman which is usually billed out at $65 .00 an hour and we only billed him out 
at $50.00 per hour hoping you would find some relief in this. Billing him out at $50.00 saved 
you an additional $127.50. 
Hopefully this information will more than clarify any misgivings you may be having with the 
electrical work at 4 708 Canary Bird Cove. If you do need further clarification on any of the work 
preformed, please call and we will have Chet personally meet with you. He will be able to go 
over all work preformed by our electricians per your request. 
We are looking forward to having this taken care of in a timely manner. If there are any 
questions, please get call as soon as possible as to not hold up this business transaction any 
further. SinA £_ 
Kim Olson (' -
I-D Electric 
----------------------
Tab 8 
1-D Electric, Inc. 
3690 S. 500 W. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attn: Kim Olson 
Dear Mr. Olson, 
Linda Gillman 
753 Shady Creek Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 l 06 
May 6, 2011 
I have been working on my house in Herriman for quite a while. I am extremely busy and finishing it has 
been frustrating, a consequence of my lengthy absences from Utah. l encountered Chet Hunter in the 
parking lot of EWS on 45 th South in March and arranged for some electrical work. He came out that 
afternoon and spent some time going through everything that remained to be done in the house and 
the garage. Chet returned the following day with two others, all of whom were there by the time I 
arrived about 10:00. I left about 3:30. I had first-hand opportunity for observation. 
When I returned to the house the next day, the only work accomplished was in the garage, though not 
everything necessary in the garage was completed. I got a bill for the stunning amount of $1,827.61. l 
then asked for an allocation of hours among tasks on the list. 
There is no question in my mind that the billed hours are significantly inflated beyond a reasonable 
amount. As an example, 14 hours are claimed for moving exactly 4 electrical cables, two of which power 
the ceiling lights in the garage, while the other two power the fixtures on either side of the garage door 
outside. All were simply draped over the rafters to their destinations and were rerouted to the center of 
the trusses, to clear the obstruction for installing a floor across the rafters. There was nothing exotic 
involved and the distance from fixtures to truss centers was short. There is permanent ladder access 
into the garage attic through retracting ceiling hatches in two places, making movement in and out of 
the area fast and easy. 
Without an exhaustive review of the remaining tasks on the list, please be advised that it is my 
considered judgment that the 25.5 hours charged for what was accomplished is commensurately 
unreasonable and warrants careful reconsideration. As you undertake that reconsideration, you might 
want to factor into your deliberation other salient information: I work in both construction and the 
practice of law. I am very familiar with job sites and courtrooms. l just completed the first $4. 74 million 
phase of a 15-month construction project in December. The second $1.5 million phase is now underway 
and will be finished this summer. This recent construction project resulted from a multi-million 
construction defect lawsuit, out of state. The last five adversaries who lined up on the other side of a 
courtroom from me are out a total of more than $11 million. 
I hired another licensed electrician to finish the work in my house and garage. What remained after the 
only day Chet was there is substantially more complicated, representing at least five times more work. I 
paid $650 for all of it {labor only). 
I am willing to pay a realistic amount for the work that was done, but no more. Please recalculate it. 
Very truly yours, 
Linda Gillman 
Tab 9 
Wheti recorded return to: 
· Wl'OllB-LawOffiees, P.C. 
Brady T. Gibbs. Esq. 
11650 South State Street, Suite 103 
Draper, UT 84020 
NOTICE OFMEmNIC'S LIEN 
11198777 
01191io111:41:00 PM $10.00 
Book - 9930 Pg - 9520 . 
GaryW. Ott 
Recorder, Salt Lake County, UT 
CORNERSTONE TIT'LE·JNS AGGY LLC 
BY: eCASH, DEPUTY - EF 1 P. 
NOTICE OF MEGHANJ:C'S LlEN IS HEREBY GIVEN by WRONA LAW OFFICES, P.C., duly authorized agent 
of I~D :Electrlc, Inc,, 3690 Soirth. 500 West, Suite 101~ Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, (801) 26fM471 (the ''Li.en 
Claim.ant"). Said agent hereby gives notice oftb.e intention of the Lien Claimant to hold and claim a mechanic's lien 
and right of cm agail;lst any rele'Vant bond, by virtue of and in accordance with the provisions ofUmh. Code Ann. 
§§ 38-1-3 et seq. (1953 as ameni!ed)). The Mecbanic's Lien is against the real property and improvements thereon 
owned or reputed to be owned by Linda T. Gillman. Said real property js located at 753 Shady Creek Place, Salt 
Lalre City, Sa-It L11ke County, Utah and is more particularl.y described 118 follows: 
UNIT 31, SHADYBROOK. CONDOMINIUM PROJECT, TOGET.BER wnH A 1.02% INTBRBST .IN 
THE COMMON .AKB.AS', ALL ACCORDlliG TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON RECORD IN 
1'.ij8 SALT LAKE COUN1Y RECORDER'S OFFICE .. 
Tax Id. No.: 16-29-358-Q32 
The Lien Clannant was employed by and did provide elec:tncal services at .the request ef Ms. Linda Gill.mail for the 
benefit and improvement of the above-deson"bed real property. The Lien Claim.ant's material and services were first 
provided on-0r about March 1 Os 2011and last provided on or about March 1~ 2011. There is due. and qwing to the 
Lien Claimant the smn of $l,864.16, together with interest at the rare of 24% per mumm, .attomey fees and oosti; 
associated ,i,itb. collection. 
PROTECTION AGAINST LIENS AND CIVJL ACTION 
NOTICE. IS BBRl:IBY PROVIDED in aooordance with Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-108 th.at under Utah law an. 
"owner'' may pa protected against lien& being mafutained a:g~ an "ovmer-occupied residence" and from other 
civil aptiol! baw,g ma:illia:il!ed to recover monies owed for "qualified services-" performed or provided by snppliera 
and subcontraqtOI3 as part of this contract, if ancf only if the following conditions are satisfi(;}d: (1) the owner ent.ered 
into a written. ct)ntract with. an origi:nal contraotor, -fac:tory built hol.lSing retailer. or a real estate developer; (2) tbe 
original contractor was pr.operly licensed or exempt from licensm'e under Title 58, Chapter '55, Utah Construstion 
'I'rai;les Licensing Act at the time the contract was executed; {3} the owner paid in fbil. 'the original contractQr, factory 
built hC11.l$illg rctiiler, (j! real estate deveioper or their successors or assigns in accordance with the written contract 
and any written or oral amendments to ~ contract; and ( 4) ,AI). owner who has satisfied l:!.ll of-these conditions may 
perfect his protection from liens- by applying for a Certificme of Compliance wfrh the Division of Occupational anii 
Professional Lic6lllling by calling (801) 530-6628 or toll free.iJ;l Utah only (.866) 275-'3675 and requesting tcr speak to 
the Lien Recovery Fund. 
DAT.ED this "bt!'-day of June, 2011. 
W'R0NALAw·OmCES, p. 
~------, 
Brady T. Gibbs, Esq, 
Attorney for I-D Electric, Inc. 
On this rf' day of June, 2011, personnliy appeared before me, Brady T. Gibbs, Esq,, Attorney for I-D 
Electric, Jnc., who upon oath did affirm that he is an aulhorized agent fo1· I-D Electric, Inc. and as such did 
voluntarily sign the foregoing Notice of Mechanic's Lien before me. 
Tab 10 
----------------------------
1-D Electric, Inc. 
3690 s. 500 w. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attn: Kim Olson 
Dear Mr. Olson, 
Linda Gillman 
753 Shady Creek Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
November 11, 2011 
Hasn't this already gone too far? First you file a lien on my property and I understand that has recently 
been followed by a lis pendens. Neither is either reasonable or justified under the circumstances, and 
without a legal basis. Please remove both immediately. There is no point in the senseless the 
accumulation of any more legal fees. It's about time to do the right thing. 
Very truly yours, 
? 
Received by:'--.:: 1,·~;.6.1 · (~:_:·/2:L•·-7, 
Date: ./ / - / / · _-::._ L' / I 
Tab 11 
When recorded return to: 
Wrona Law Offices, P.C. 
.Brady T. Oibbs1 Esq. 
II650 South State Street, Suite 103 
Draper, UT 84020 
11292598 
12/6/2011 4:53:00 PM $12.00 
Book - 9972 Pg - 5353--5354 
GaryW.Ott 
Recorder, Salt Lake County, UT 
CORNERSTONE mLE INS AGCY LLC 
BY: eCASH, DEPUTY - EF 2 P. 
AiVIENDED NOTICE OF l\'IECHANIC'S LIEN 
This AMENDED NOTICE OF :MECHANIC'S LIEN IS HEREBY GIVEN by WRONA LAW OFFICES, P.C., duly 
authorized agent of I-D Electric, Inc., 3690 South 500 West, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, (801) 26~ 
1471 (the "Lien Claimant''), for the purpose of correcting the address and legal description contained :in that certain 
Notice of Mechanic's Lien, previously recorded on. June 15, 2011, as Entry No. 11198777, in Book 9930, Page 
9520, in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, State of Utah, and which Mechanic's Lien was filed against 
that parcel of real property and improvements thereon owned or reputed to be owned by Linda T. Gillman. Said 
real property is located at 753 Shady Creek Place, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah and is more 
particularly described as follows: 
UNIT 31, SHADYBROOK CONDOMINIUM PROJECT, TOGETHER WITH A 1.02% lNIEREST ThT 
THE COMlv!ON AREAS, ALL ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON RECORD IN 
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE .. 
Tax Id. No.: 16-29-358-032 
Said agent hereby gives notice that Lien Claimant does not intend to claim any interest in the above-referenced 
property, and that the correct address and legal description of the property which the Lien Claimant intended under 
the Mechanic's Lien in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann.§§ 38-1-3 et seq. (1953 as amended), is 
~aainst the real property and improvements thereon owned or reputed to be owned by Anne Tracy and Linda 
Tracy. Said real property is located at 4708 Canary Bird Cove, Herrimnn, Salt Lake County, Utah and is more 
particularly descn'bed as follows: 
Lot 663, COPPER CREEK ESTATES PHASE 6, according to the official plat thereat: as recorded in the 
office of the Salt Lake County.Recorder. 
Ta."'< Parcel No.: 27-30-151-037 
The Lien Claimant was employed by and did provide electrical services at the request of Ms. Linda Gillman for the 
benefit and improvement of the above-descnoed real property. The Lien Claimant's material and services were fust 
provided on or about March 10, 201land last provided on or about March 11, 2011. There is due and owing to the 
Lien Claimant the sum oUl,864.16, together with interest at the rate of24% per annum, attorney fees and costs 
associated with collection. 
PROTECTION AGAINST LIENS AND CIVIL ACTION 
NOTICE IS HEREBY PROVIDED in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-108 that under Utah law an 
"owner' may be protected ~aainst liens being maintained against an "owner-occupied residence,, and from other 
civil action being maintained to recover monies owed for "qualified services" performed or provided by suppliers 
and subcontractors as part of this contract, if and only if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the owner entered 
into a written contract with an original contractor, factory built housing retailer1 or a real estate developer; (2) the 
original contractor was properly licensed or exempt from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction 
Trades Licensing Act at the time the contract was executed; (3) the owner paid in full the original contractor, factory 
built housing retailer, or real estate developer or their successors or assigns in accordance with the written contract 
and any written or oral amendments to the contractj end ( 4) An owner who has satisfied all of these conditioDS may 
perfect his protection from liens by applying for a Certificate of Compliance with the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing by calling (801) 530-6628 or toll free in Utah only (866) 275-3675 and requesting to speak to 
the Lien Recovery Fund. 
---------------- ---·-····-·-·---····---
Tab 12 
Mechanic's Lien Statute 
(Renumbered UCA §38-la-301} 
UCA §38-1-3. Those entitled to lien --What may be attached. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter, a person who performs preconstruction 
service or construction service on or for real property has a lien on the real property for 
the reasonable value of the preconstruction service or construction service, 
respectively, except as provided in Section 38-11-107. 
{2) A person may claim a preconstruction service lien and a separate construction 
service lien on the same real property. 
(3) (a) A construction service lien may include an amount claimed for a 
preconstruction service. 
(b) A preconstruction service lien may not include an amount claimed for 
construction service. 
(4) A lien under this chapter attaches only to the interest that the owner or owner-
builder has in the real property that is the subject of the lien. 
Mechanic's Lien Attorney Fee Statute 
(Renumbered UCA §38-la-707} 
UCA §38-1-18. Attorney fees -- Offer of judgment. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action brought 
to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable attorney fees, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as 
costs in the action. 
(2) A person who files a wrongful lien as provided in Section 38-la-308 may not recover 
attorney fees under Subsection (1). 
(3) (a) A person against whom an action is brought to enforce a preconstruction or 
construction lien may make an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(4) (b) If the offer is not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is 
not more favorable than the offer, the offeree shall pay the costs and attorney fees 
incurred by the offerer after the offer was made. 
@ 
Wrongful Lien Statute 
UCA §38-9-1.1 Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful 
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee, 
trustee, or beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who offers a 
document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a lien, or 
notice of interest, or other claim of interest in certain real property. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real 
property. 
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful 
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, titleholder, mortgagee, 
trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that real property appears 
in the county recorder's records for the county in which the property is located. 
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain 
real property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the county in 
which the property is located. 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien, notice of 
interest, or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time 
it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real 
property. 
1 Revised, effective May 13, 2014, numbered UCA §38-9-102 
Wrongful Lien Sanctions 
(Renumbered UCA §38-9-203) 
UCA §38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien -- Damages. 
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in Section 
38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder against real property 
is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused by the 
wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of Subsection (1) refuses to release or correct the 
wrongful lien within ten days from the date of written request from a record interest 
holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known address of 
the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record interest holder for $3,000 or for 
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $10,000 or for treble 
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who 
records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-
9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, knowing or having 
reason to know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
Tab 13 
Mark D. Stubbs (9353) 
Fillmore Spencer LLC 
3301 N. University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Tel: (801) 426-8200 
Fax: (801) 426-8208 
mstubbs@fslaw.com 
Allorneys.for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
1-D ELECTRIC, INC. a Utah Coq)oration, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LINDA T. GILLMAN, 
Defendant. 
-
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
DISCLOSURE 
Civil No. 110917777 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn 
Linda T. Gillman, by and through her counsel of record, files this supplemental 
disclosure pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(I ). Delivery 
Notice/Reminder/Receipts dated 5/20/11, 6/17/11, 6/23/11, 8/18/11 and 8/24/11 are attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A." 
DA TED this ~day of November, 2014. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
EXH(BIT "A" . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
United States Poslal Service~ Today's Dato 
S_orry We ri11lss€d You! liVe ~0Deliver Tor You ~ - ' 
Item Is at: ' :;J:C;, Avajlable for Pick-up:Afler 
- Post Office™ /See back) 
__:--retter 
_ l ari;e 
envelope, 
magazine, 
catalog, etc. 
_Date: 
Fo~·oallvory: (Eriteftotal number of items 
dehverod by service type:) . 
Fpr Notica:Loft: (Ch.eek applicable item) 
_ Express fylail" _ lnsuroo Mail 
JTime: 
Article Numbaf(s) 
·' 
~ Certified Mail™ _ Return Receipt r-- --- ~ ---- -------
- Restricied '(Must claim wilhin-15 days for Merchandiser----------,,--,,---=-- - - -
- · Parrer 
Delivery or article •tn1I be returned) . 
- Perishable 
Item ·· 
- Other. 
! t~ttrm l J J1Ttr;~:~tion™ .. 
l-Jfflb~~ .I ~ !fillatur~ . Cus_tomer Naine andF.~dre~ 
,..,;;;:-:;:;:;:-:::::;:;::':-;~- ----,-- -- -· _ __:Co~n~fi~rm::'a~tlo~n~"'::J Miele "Requiring Payment " · t. ~- '-·· · 
-~ - '"" 
- . " •• ~.;.. }-. ' ...: '"· ( ~.r' ; ~ ~ -
· Delivered By and Dat_e / 
I .' , _ , 
"'-._-_,.,. 
Delivery Notlce/Reminder/Receipt 
We will redeliver ciR·you or ygur agenlcan plcl< up ypur mail at U1e Post Office. (Bring this form and proper ID. ,; your 
agent will pfck up, sign below'i11 item 2, and e11tei: a·gent's·nam·e.here): 
·1, a. Chocka/1/hatapplyin \ SUGARHOUSE POST OFFICE 
soct,on ·3; . · 
b:Signinse'ction2'b~(ow; 1_953 S 1100.E. . 
c. Lsa, .. lhisno:ice1,1>ero SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84106-9998 
1hacam-0~can seo ij, . M-F B:00-6:00-SA T 10:00-2:00 
2. Sign Here to-aqthoriie redelivery www.usps.io m·/redelivery cir ·800-f'.,SK-USPS (275:-8777) 
or to authoiize:an'agent to sign 
for you: 
_- - I 
· ----- --·-· ---.- - Signature, 
3. • Redeliver (Enter day ofwilok.): ! 
(Alio'H at l!S3St lwo da!ivory do;; r~ ----
redoll'rory, or go lo us;js.comlrodoli'.-Cty 
:d~~.~27ffe-8m 10 a~ngo 
D Leave item at,my,address 
I X l 
Printed 1
1 
Name 
Delivery Section 
De_livery 
·- ---------i Address , (Sl)'J?fywfroratoloaw. Exan:pl'l: ' !-----'---'---------------- -------
'p(J(Ch·, -sido d!Jt.Y. Thi& opUon la not 
3.Wtllablct If box fs chocl:.od on tho lro nt 
roqulcing your,slgni:lturo ilt t.Jmo of 11111 I\\· 11 1·\lll\rlHllllll llHI dcllvory.} 
PS Fonn 3849, September 2009 (Reverse) 5293 0368 2744 9107 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
United Slates Postal Servicei> 0 jToday'spate .t 
Sorry We Mls~ed Yo_u! We- <f Deliver for You v-,? £./ / 7 / , 
Item is at A1•ailable for Picl{~up After 
b Post Office TU (See baef) 
Dale: 
0 
_ Letter •For Delivery: (Enle'r total number of items 
· defiveredby,.serv/ce_ type.) 
• If check~d, you o·ryou~agant rifust-l?e presant 
at time of dollvory to sign fot itell). . 
- large 
envelope, 
rr.agazine, 
catalog, etc. 
-Parcel 
For NotJco·· I;eft: (Check tipplicebfe item)' 
_ Exp((lSS Mail' _ Insured Mail 
Article Number{s) 
-- f"z;; / C c2 5-y 
_ Reslricied 
Delivery 
_:_:_:::.:Certified Mail"' _ Rsrum Receipt . 
(Must claim wilhin.15 days for.Me'rcllandisel------------------
or artlcle will lie retuniod} 
_ Perishable 
Item 
- Other: 
Finn Bil! , _ .Delivery 
·eo.nfirmation ™ 
I - Registered Ma_il™ - Signature Customer Name and Address .. Con~imati6n™ ' / / "t_.._ " ~ 
.. •i . ~ 
Article Requiring Payment Amount Due 1-----:--.,~_- -=':""-, _---.:.,c..., :....:"'c_- _~/~--·-'-,-c-,.-_-_-(""' •.. -. -._.- ---
• Postage.Due .ci cob . • ·customs\. S . , ) ~ , - , · ?.._ 
0 F.inal·Notice: ·Article will 'be returned 
to sander on 
Delivered By and Dale 
PS Form 3849, September 2009 Delivery Notice/Reminder/Receipt 
We will redeliver OR you or your qgent can pick up-your, mair at.the Post Office. 
agent will pick up, sign·be/ow in item-2; and enlef agent's name· here); 
1. a. Chock all that apply In 
(Bring this form and proper IP. If your 
IP...,._ · section 3; . 
~ b. Sign iry siictian 2'belaw; 
c. Leovo"lhis notico where 
. tJ1?J .ca!Tier can sco iL 
2. Sign Here to authorize redelivery 
or to authorize an.agent to sign 
for.you: 
3.0 Redeliver-(1:~1~,d~yoiweek.): 
(Allow at least t.YO dot:..Oery µ.,ys: for 
redef1vecy, °' g~ to u~!lccm/rodoiiv-.,ry 
Cl' ca!! 600--2i$-8777 le ~rr.109{1 
re-dollve,y.J 
• Leave item at my add_ress 
(Spoci/y ,moro lo loavo. Exnmplo: 
"porch", 'sida door". TI1ls optlon ro not 
::iv.ilI;ibl-o If box JS cluk.luid on 1ho front 
roqulr1ng your sign;,turo ill tlma or 
dollvory.j 
SUGARHOUSE POST OF.FICE 
1-953 ·s ·1100 E 
SALT LAKE CITY, .UT'84106-9998 
M-F 8:00-6:00 SAT 10 :00-2 :00 
W\'fll.USP,s.corrifredelivery or 800-ASK-USPS {275-8777) 
Signature ) 
X l 
Printed 
Name 
DeHvery 
Address 
Delivery Seqtion · 
- j 
, ' 
I~ . / '7l' J i.__ ) 
._., ,. / 
.,,.•-
( ,·• ,;; ' ,. __ . .. . .... J 1 ....... 
PS ·Form 3849; September 2009 ·(Reve,;,e) 5293 0368 27 46 5626 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
United States Postal Service~ I Today's 9a1e 
SorryV!fe MissedYou!-We ~0Deliverfor'/ou (?/;.i'3 
l~•at -- --· I Available for Pick-up After 1 • 
_ _ Post Office,,. (See b?ck) I 
Dale: I Time: 
I' Sender's Np.me yl/rfJ,~1 
_. ___ Letter . For polivery: (Enter-total number of items 
delivered by service typo.) 
• Ii c;hecked,_yolJ O:r-youf.'agoril mList'lie present 
· at time of delivery to ~ign for'itom. 
__ ·Large · 
envelope, For.Notice Left: (Check Of?plicabte iiem) Artlcle-Number_{s) · . _ 
-itill -2-11rd ?'1Jlt !..l J ¥.z& .. ?7'</ magazine, . . 
catalog. ·e1c. _ Express Mail• _ Insured Mail 
- Parcel· / • 
...L ce·rtified Man™ _ Return Receipt . 
_ Restricled . (Must claim wit/iin 15 days for Merchandise 1-. __ _,.r_i,-,'....-i "'ir--,-; -· _:_"fr H+r ';" l !"'ii f t 
Delivery or article will be returned) !» • iU\ t. £!4 ~ H f · · i'~ 
_ _ Perishable .Firin Bill _ Delivery [ H1fi L. h U H UL 
Item Confirmation n1 
- Other. Registered_ Mail™ 
1.,. 
De!iverJ,Notice/Reminder/Receipt 
W_e,will redeliver 0~ YO)! ·_or y~ur_ agent can ~ick up your mail at the Rost Office. (Bring-this form and•proper /0. 
a entw1//. /ck u • s1gn:below m item 2, and enter-agent's name·here): · 
1.' a. P!ock_alrthatapplyin . SUGARHOUSE POST OF 
soctlon 3; . , . FICE • b. Sign in section,2below; 1953 s ·11po E . . 
C. Loavolh'.s noliCBwh?"J SALT LAKE c;:1rv; UT'~4106-9998 
lhe~rc.snsileff. ·M-F 8,00-6:00 SAT 1 OW0-2:00 
2. Sign Here ro authorize·redelivery www.usps.coni/redeliv'ery or 800-ASK-USF?S-(27.5-8777) 
orto_authonze ,m agen/ to sign · 
for you: 
::-:::-=-,----,--::--- ----1-S-,g-ria_t_ur-e'I_ - - - - - - -
3. :J Redeliver (Enter day of week.}: 
X 
(Al:ow .:it le.1st t\~ derr.•o·ry aa}-s tor 
re.do I ivory, or !)O to u:;ps.c::;mlrod01ivory • 
or c:lll ~275-a777 to \lrr.:mgc 
r~d~fyory,} · 
Printed 
Na.me 
• Lea've item at my address Deli~ery / 
Delivery Sect~:1 _ _ _ 
If your 
.tSP'?"1tyu1>iro 101""""· E:,-;;,;;pJo: - Address I 
'pcf!=h~, 'sid!Jd~. ThtsoPtionlsnot - - -~- ----- --,-----~ --- -----
~:i;~~F;::,',~~~:!~t~l:~;;ront USPS 11111 111 1111 /.JHIIHll·IIIIIII II llf 
5293 0368 27 41 6277' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
United States Postal Service~ 0 I T~ay' Date 
Sony We Missed You! We ~ Deliver for You o ~ 
l~-nisat: Available for Pick-up After 1- Po_s1 Office"' (Soe b·ack) 
Date: 
-------f- Letter For Ocillvery: (Enter tcital number o( items delivered by service _type.) 
- ;~~~~cpe, For. Notlca·Left: (Check app/ica_ble item) 
magazine, Ex M . .,, I d M ·1 catalog, elc. 1 -:; pre~ a11· _ nsure a1 
__ Certified Mail™ . Return Receipt 
lime: 
• If 5=heckec,! , you•or'your agont mus! be prasont 
·attlme of dellvery to sign for Item. 
- Parcel /' /_ 
_ Restricted j.Must c/ai,fl within 15 days for Merchandlse1-------- ---------------
Delivery or article 1vil/ be rotumed) 
_ Perishable 
Item 
- OL'le r: 
Fi(TTI Bill 
Registered Mail"' 
_ Delivery 
Confirmation"' 
- Signature 
Confiimationn, 
ArJcle Requiring P.aynien~ Amount Due 
u Postage Due D cob D Customs $ 
:..J F.inaJ_ Notice: Article will be returned 
to senper ci:i . 
PS·Form-3849, Septerntier 2009 Delive;y Notice/Ramlnder/Recaipt 
We will ~ed1;tiver 0R you or your.agent can pick up your.mail at the Pcist Office. (Bring this form and proper ID. /{your 
agent v111/-p1ck up, sign below in ifein-2, and enter.agent's name here); · 
1· a: Cha';1' al'.tlialepp1yin. SUGARHOUSE POST OFFIGE 
~ section 3, ·· .•. ~ b.Signin sacllon2below;. 1953-S 1100-E 
c. ~eal'flUiisnolicew/Jero SALT LAKE CITY, UT !34106-9998 
the'carrier=sea·it. M,F, 8:00'-\,:00 SAT 10:00-2:0f 
2. Sign_ Here fq authoriz~ re'detiyer'j ~ .usps.com/redelivery oi"800-ASK-USPS (275:./3777) 
or to authonze an·ag!inl to ,sigq · 
foryo!f:. Del_ivery Section 
3,cJ Redeliver (Enterdayofweek.): · · ...; · . · . •·- - Signature] 
. . X . 
(AllO\~ ~t lco~t two delivery days for 
tedclivo:y, or oo lo IJ.Sp$.commJdcli\'Ory 
or c,ill e00-275-llm lo ntrango 
rc<lcli'l1!1)'.) . 
D Leave.item at my adafess 
{Sp;,f-'fylll: -;;ro lo loa·vo. icim;;;-· 
'po_rr:JJ •, •skJo doo~. Thls oPtlon Is not 
.av,1 llablo If box Cs checked on'thO front 
tt1qu1rinoyour r.lgnaturo :it tlin(IOf 
dolli.;flry.J 
Printed 
Name 
Delivery I Address . 
PS Fam, 3849, September 2009 (Reverse) 
.)s3 
IIUl:111.IIII IIIIHHll:llllll I IUII 
5293 0386 6994 9418 
• 
• 
• 
Uniled States Postal Service~ 0 
Sorry We.Missed You!We <foeliverforYou 
Item is at: · 
- - Post Office"' (See back) 
Dale: 
Delivered By and Date 
Delivery Notice1Reminder/Receipt 
We will redeliver OR you or .your agent can pick up ymj'r in ail at the Post Office. (Bring this form and proper ID. If your 
agent will ick up, si n,be/ow in item 2, and enter.·aaen/'s name here/: 
1· · a: ChockolllhiJlapplyin' SUGARHOUSE·POST OFFICE ~ 
siJction·J• 
b, Sign' fn•s~cl/on 2 bo/mv; 1953 s 1 ~ 00 E 
c.· LM\'9/hisl)()l'cOwhsro SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84106-9998 
lhecamorcan.saoff. M,F 8:00-6:00 SAT 10:0002: 00 . 
2."Sign Hera to.authorize redelivery • www.usps,com/redelivery or 800-ASK·-USPS (275:8777) 
or Id authorize an agent to sign for you: Qelivery Section 
------------"-1Signature 
3.0 Redeliver (Enlardayofwoek.}: X 
(Allow ai lcas!h,O,, dolivcryda}'O tor Pr,·nted 
rodolivoiy, or go lo usps.oo.7J/rvd,i/'l!!,y 
orcol1800-ZTS-8mtoorrango Name-
rodc!lvcry.J 
o Leave item at my.address Delivery 
------1 Address 
(Spoc!lywf>oro fo/onvo. exomplo: 1----'----------------------
•p()ft/1 ·, "sidadool'. Thin cpt!On Is not 
nvnilabfo Ir bOx'!.s chcckod on thri front 
rc°qulring your aigno:uro .it llmO Ot I( g ~It,)~ 
d•llvcry.) l!,J igJ Jr 'lJ 
:: R(;lfused ' '•-"~~ q~-~furn] · 
PS Fann 3849, Septernber2009 (Reverse) 5293 0386 6997 8654 
